Understanding War and Society

The previous post looked at France and the Second World War, and explored a possible march to war by France in 1939, meaning that France actually sought war with Germany in 1939.

If this turns out to be true (i.e. once we can read internal French archives in another 100 years or so and discern what the French were really up to) what are we to make of this French march to war from the point of view of war as a policy choice and of society generally? What lessons may this have for us today?

One way to consider France’s march is to realize that there were likely two marches underway at the same time, each feeding off the other – France and Germany locked in a dance of death. The “tit-for-tat” build-up to aggression leading to war in situations like this, which sees each side issue threats and commit aggressive acts against the other ostensibly in response to the other side’s threats and aggressive acts, worked in 1939 for both parties, and it works even today. Leaders who play this game, and who issue threats or order aggressive acts “in response” can assess full well what the other side’s response will most likely be well in advance. It is a response expected and even hoped-for on the road to an escalation to war that is often desired by both parties.

Encouraging one side to resist the temptation to respond even in the face of the gravest of atrocities, and exposing purposeful escalation as a “march to war” would obviously assist in halting that very march in its tracks. Halting escalation is, in fact, the essence of peace-keeping – a real contribution to world peace. This would have availed the world nothing in 1939 however, as, assuming the French were also on the march, both sides were intent on aggression.

What to do about war? There seem to be two basic philosophical approaches to the problem.

The first approach could look at the history of marches to war for a contribution to our understanding of how nations go to war, and assert that by better understanding this process – how decisions are made, by whom and for what purpose, and how these are then translated into the mobilization of the population - perhaps we can learn how to avoid war in the future. In light of this, future questions worthy of exploration could include how information is gathered and assessed within the intelligence bureaucracies that served the French leaders who led France into war in the years leading up to 1939. In looking at this, historians would be seeking access to the “secret nation” which existed outside of public scrutiny, and to delve into how this world operates in the search for answers and possible proscriptions for the future. Should such an exploration reveal patterns of behavior common to all societies that inevitably lead to war, and methods by which these may be expunged, the service to humanity that such a turn of events would present is obvious.

A second approach could suggest otherwise - at least a modification. It may be that as the history of this period is further explored, historians may come to understand better how leaders manipulate their peoples in order to march to war, but also that as every politician - democrat and tyrant alike – knows, people can only be lead where they are willing to go. In other words, that the “secret nation” can only manipulate to a limited extent. Regarding France, note that it appeared at times that the leadership was often behind the people in terms of the march to war, not ahead of them. Was this by design, or did it represent a leadership out of control? In light of this, the questions to be explored further could center on the psychology of peoples, not the machinations of leaders and their advisors. The answers to the Human curse of war may therefore lie not at the head of society, but within its soul.

In that respect, it should be obvious that both tyrants and democrats need to justify their actions, especially over such matters as war, because popular opinion always matters to every politician, everywhere. The tremendous advantage that democratic politicians have over tyrants is a mandate to govern that permits them to set aside worry about what the people are thinking, and to just get on with the job of governing. More than that, should they lose an election and thereby lose power, they are always free to try to come back again another day – losing power for a democrat does not mean non-existence.

Democrats then, having the luxury of a mandate, have nothing to fear from letting liberty and the best in humanity flourish, including what may be a natural human pacifism. Perhaps this is the essential explanation for the fact that, generally-speaking, liberal democracies do not fight wars against one another, nor do they experience famine. In short, liberty is liberating for leaders and citizens alike, and the results benefit everyone.

Tyrants, on the other hand, who never assess the will of the people in any meaningful way, must always worry. To stay in power, they must manufacture the illusion of the positive while at the same time emphasizing the negatives that support their control, and especially the triumvirate of “fear, national crises, and enemies of the people”. This approach must always lead to a war of some sort, whether it is a war against some internal societal scourge, or actual external aggression. In matters of external aggression, tyrants mobilize their people by playing on the natural divisions and hatreds that burn in the soul of many a nation. These divisions and hatreds immediately come to be the essence of the wars that are subsequently fought, and they seriously limit the ability of tyrants to control the events that follow. In a tyranny, not even the tyrant is free.

In considering the various democratic and tyrannical motivations that both sparked the Second World War, and which governed its progress, it may be trite to say that this was much more than just a war. Once launched, it quickly became a battle between the negativity needed and encouraged by tyranny on the one side – culminating in horror that will always exist where one finds humanity led by those who are operating absent a higher morality - and the common human decency of the liberal democracies that sought to stop it.

The tragedy of the pre-war years may not be that democratic politicians sought to lead a march to war. It may be that those who could have, and who should have mobilized citizens who were willing to be led in the name of this same common human decency - that is the democratic politicians of the West - simply abandoned their duty, and in doing so permitted horror and hatred to grow and flourish, culminating in war that could have been stopped long before it happened.

Along with a better understanding of the psychology of peoples then – and, it is suggested, such an analysis should look closely at the psychology of people absent the direction of a higher morality - it may also be worth exploring how leaders in democracies sometimes come to forget their most essential duties, and the most obvious national security interests of their citizens. Interests that are easily understood by the citizens themselves.