The Conscription Crisis and the
City of Ottawa
There is no
one definitive history of Canada, nor is one reasonably foreseeable. The problem in producing such a history
relates to the nature of the country itself; Canada is, and always has been,
too diverse in term of its character and in terms of its collective experiences
to permit one definitive history to ever be produced. What Canada “is” consists of a series of
different memories possessed by different collectivities, each with its own
unique experience and its own unique set of recollections.
The local focus of this paper reflects two recent contributions dealing with the First World War: Ian Hugh MacLean Miller’s Our Glory and Our Grief – Torontonians and The Great War and Robert Rutherdale’s Hometown Horizons – Local Responses to Canada’s Great War.
Regarding Toronto’s reaction to conscription in the First World War, Miller wrote that, “Toronto…voted overwhelmingly for candidates pledged to support the Military Service Act. Despite three long years of ever more costly war, Torontonians were virtually unanimous in their support for conscription.” Further, he noted that, “From the Liberal Star, which described the action as ‘absolutely necessary’, to the Conservative Mail and Empire, the daily press offered ringing endorsements of the new policy.” Support for conscription also flowed from Anglicans and Baptists, from the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, and from various religious periodicals. The only group that held back full endorsement was organized labour, which wanted to see wealth conscripted along with men. More ominously, from the perspective of English-French relations, Miller noted that, “Initial anger at Laurier’s decision to reject a coalition with Borden led to a conviction that English-speaking Canadians now have their way.”
Rutherdale’s work, which looks at the mid-sized communities of Guelph, Trois-Rivieres, and Lethbridge, notes that by the spring of 1917, “…conscription had divided Canadians as no other issue in the war had done. It would divide the Liberal Party along a line of competing nationalisms and lead to coalition government under the Union banner.” He also maintains that,
Support for conscription obviously depended on attitudes
held well beyond a given locale, especially when voters went to the polls in
1917 to vote for Laurier in Quebec or Borden in all regions and overseas. In very different ways our cases suggest that
power to inducement into uniform became embedded in the politics of local
perception. The varied responses that
power prompted from people living beneath the powerful edges of home town
horizons indicate how the conscription crisis of the Great War challenged
interests and aims firmly rooted in local and regional histories. They reflected the varied social fabric of a
home front deeply divided by 1917.
As with Miller, many of the aspects noted by Rutherdale in respect of local press reactions to the Great War were also evident in Ottawa twenty years later; in particular, the French-English divide, and the way in which local identities informed political opinions.
Prior to launching into an analysis of how the conscription crisis in the Second World War impacted in Ottawa, some appreciation of the city’s demographic and political make-up, and of the issue of conscription itself, are required.
Sixty-five years ago Ottawa was a city with not two, but three, major political cultures: i) French Canadians showing deference to “L’eglise et le patrie”, where “the nation” was more of a pan-Canadian concern than a Quebec-based reality; ii) English Canadian, with strong anti-capitalist and quasi-socialist leanings driven by years of depression, and a growing desire to expand and cement Canada’s independence from Britain; and iii) what may be termed Anglo Canadian, conservative admirers of the British Empire of which they believed Canada was naturally a part.
In 1941, Ottawa had a total population of about 154,000 people. Of this, some 15% were born in Quebec; 8% were born in the British Isles, including 5% from England; 2% from the United States; about 5% from the other provinces outside of Ontario; and about 70% were born in Ontario. Over the previous 20 years, the proportion of people who were born in the British Isles dropped from about 11% of the population in Ottawa, to about 8% by 1941. Of the population in Ottawa who were born in Canada about 60% of British ancestry and about 30% of French Canadian background. In terms of religious affiliation, Ottawa reported 76,607 Catholics, 27,281 Anglicans, 26,903 Methodist/United, and 9,981 Presbyterians in 1941.
The workforce in Ottawa changed dramatically starting in the First World War, and continuing right through to 1945. From 1911 to 1921, the number of federal employees in Ottawa grew from about 4,200 to about 10,000. In 1939, there were just less than 12,000 such employees. By 1945, the number had grown three-fold to 37,000. Of these, about 7,000 were permanent members of the Civil Service, and about 30,000 were temporary employees. This made the federal government by far the largest employer in the city. Although there were reductions after the war, by 1951 the total employed in the civil service in Ottawa still numbered over 30,000.
The nature of the workforce in Ottawa had implications for any possible citizen-based response to the issue of conscription in the city. Civil servants are sworn to support government policy, regardless of their personal political beliefs. This reality provided a unique limitation on the nature of the possible popular support for, or opposition to a policy of conscription within the city. In essence, the nature of Ottawa’s workforce meant that any vigorous pubic reaction to the issue could have had very serious implications for the careers of many of the possible participants in any such reaction.
In terms of political affiliation, in the 1940s Ottawa was inclined towards the Liberal Party. The federal ridings of Ottawa West, and Ottawa East had been created in 1933. In the federal election of 1935, Ottawa East returned the Liberal candidate, Edgar Chevrier with the support of 16,598 votes. His nearest opponent was the Jean Tissot who ran for the Anti-Communist Party. In a by-election in the same riding on October 26, 1936, Liberal Joseph Albert Pinard was elected with 9,726 votes with the runner-up being William Michael Unger who ran for the Independent Liberals. In the election of 1940, Joseph Pinard was re-elected with 12,373 votes to 10,526 for the Independent Liberal candidate. The National Government candidate (i.e. Conservative) received just 6,149 votes.
In Ottawa West, Thomas Franklin
Ahearn was returned for the Liberals in 1935 with 21,503 votes to 15,219 for
his Conservative competitor, while, in 1940, George J. McIlraith was elected
for the Liberals with 27,460 votes to the National Government candidate who
received 19,780 votes.
Besides the reality of a civil service oath restraining the ability of many of the citizens of Ottawa to either vigorously support or oppose conscription, Ottawa also largely supported the party in power throughout the war. This implied a second major restraint on any citizen-based reactions to a policy of conscription, in the sense that the majority in the city, which mostly voted Liberal, could also be relied upon to support the policies of a Liberal government.
This assertion begs the question - what was the actual reaction to the issue of conscription within the city itself? A review of the happenings in the city itself throughout the war, and around the key time frames for the conscription debate, tends to support the above hypothesis that the civil service and Liberal nature of the city tempered reactions to the debate. The following analysis will concentrate on reports in The Ottawa Citizen, simply because it was about twice the size of the other two major papers – The Ottawa Journal, and Le Droit - and its reporting on local happenings was therefore much more thorough.
In terms of demonstrations either for or against conscription, there appear to have been few if any such manifestations of popular support or unrest in Ottawa during the war. Around the time of the plebiscite in April of 1942, for example, The Ottawa Citizen, in reporting on plebiscite-related violence, noted that a “yes” sign in Hull, Quebec had been defaced with the word “no” painted over the actual word “yes”. This is hardly note-worthy, and it is suggested that the fact that it was noted speaks to the relative lack of any other major disturbances.
There were some reports of conscription-related violence during the plebiscite period, but the reports pertained to violence in other cities. For example, the Citizen reported that windows had been smashed by anti-conscription rioters in Montreal on March 25, 1942. The author did not locate any such reports of conscription-related property damage within the city of Ottawa itself.
Of course, there were numerous
parades in Ottawa during the war, but they were not specifically
conscription-related. For example, on
March 27, 1942, the Citizen reported that thousands had watched the
Ottawa Garrison parade through Ottawa streets, with about 4,000 men
participating. While such a march only a
month before the plebiscite itself may perhaps have been provocative, the
express purpose of the march was to draw attention to the Canadian Army Train,
on display in the city at the time. Another example was a Catholic parade for
an early victory, and peace that was held on July 6, 1943. This demonstration could not have been seen
as a subtle call for anything other than an end to the war.
Within the city, various organizations expressed their opinions regarding the issue of conscription, especially around the time of the plebiscite campaign. These included the local branch of the Legion, which held a mass meeting in favour of conscription on April 21, 1942, and calls for a “yes” vote by G. Russell Boucher, Conservative member from Carleton.
The press also did carry reports of the activities of those in Canada who were opposed to conscription. On February 11, 1943, for example, the Citizen carried a report about Maxime Raymond, founder of the Bloc Populaire Canadien, and outlined his assertion that the public had been fooled regarding the conscription issue. As well, on March 4, 1943, Rene Chalouit, also a member of the Bloc Populaire was reported to have stated in the Legislature in Quebec that the Godbout government had abolished liberty through its support of the war effort. These reports focused on activities outside of Ottawa, however, as there were few activities within the city itself.
The suggestion above is that the civil service nature of the workforce in Ottawa, combined with the political leanings of the population, worked to generate calm within the city regarding the issue of conscription. A review of newspaper reports around the time of major events related to the conscription issue bears this out. As well, the management of the issue by King’s government must also be seen to have been a contributor to the calm, in that, unlike during the First World War where the issue was concentrated in one divisive election campaign, during the Second World War it came slowly over a period of five years.
While reaction to the
conscription issue in the street was muted, the debate in the leading
newspapers of the day was furious. An
assessment of this debate, and commentary on how the policies of the King
government concerning conscription were perceived at the time, is the essence
of this paper. To facilitate this, an
understanding of both the policy itself, and how it has been interpreted,
follows.
In judging King’s accomplishments in this regard, Jack Granatstein wrote that,
Canada’s entry into the war and the conscription crisis
were the most crucial tests of French-English unity during the period, and
there can be no doubt that King coped with them masterfully. There were divisions, demonstrations, and
different attitudes in Quebec, but there was no breakdown in relations between
the two cultures, no great cleavage as in 1917.
Popular memories of the Great War years tended to forbid this, but Mackenzie
King’s policies and his skills at political management largely contributed to
the eased relationship, as did a substantially greater effort from French
Canada. King’s tack was to resist
conscription as long as possible, to hold off, to delay, to move but
half-steps. Not an exciting or
satisfying policy, it was nonetheless effective and successful.
How did the press in Ottawa see
the issue during the war? Was there
general acceptance of King’s cautious approach, or was there something
else?
Conscription emerged as an issue before Canada went to war against Germany. On the heels of the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 – six months before the war in Europe started - Prime Minister King advised the House of Commons that in the event of war there would be no conscription for overseas service. Canada declared war on Germany on September 10, 1939. Two days earlier King again stood up in the House of Commons and promised for a second time that there would be no conscription for wartime service overseas.
Within two months of Canada’s declaration of war on Germany, King and the federal Liberals faced a potentially divisive provincial election in Quebec on October 25, 1939. The then Premier of Quebec, Maurice Duplessis, had called the election over the two issues of Quebec’s autonomy in the face of a wartime federal government armed with the War Measures Act, and on the related issue of conscription. The election was won handily by the Quebec Liberals under Adelard Godbout with very heavy assistance from the federal Liberals in Ottawa. This support included both campaign money and a threat by the three most powerful Quebec Ministers in Ottawa to resign should Duplessis win the election, thereby leaving the people of Quebec with no one to defend their interests in Ottawa. It was apparent at the time that these “interests” essentially came down to one: the avoidance of conscription for overseas service.
The federal election held March 26, 1940 was the next challenge for the Liberal government. The government was in the fourth year of its mandate when war came in 1939. During the emergency that saw Canada’s declaration of war in September 1939, King and Dr. Manion, the Conservative Leader of the Opposition, had agreed that there would be no election until after a new sitting of the House of Commons began in January, 1940. The clear implication was that there would be a sitting of Parliament starting in January, 1940.
On January 18, 1940, a motion was passed in the Legislature of Ontario which criticized the federal government war effort. This motion which was sponsored by the Conservatives in Ontario, and supported by the Liberal Premier Hepburn, passing with the support of 18 Conservatives and 26 Liberals, with King’s government supported by only 10 Ontario Liberals.
Following the Ontario motion, King decided to immediately call an election rather than face the House of Commons on the issue of the federal government’s conduct of the war. This was duly announced in the Speech from the Throne on January 25, 1940 and, given the earlier promise of an actual parliamentary session to Dr. Manion, this move took the opposition completely by surprise - Manion had been effectively outmaneuvered.
During the election, the Conservatives, who also opposed conscription for overseas service at this time, ran on a national unity government platform. The Liberals refused to consider this, and ran on their promise to not conscript for overseas service. Given general satisfaction with the war effort to date, the result was a Liberal landslide, with the Liberals taking 184 of 245 seats, with the rest being divided between 39 Conservatives, 10 Social Credit, 8 Canadian Commonwealth Federation, and 4 Independents. King was guaranteed uncontested control of the war effort for the next five years.
he promise to not conscript for overseas military service, and the refusal of a national government - which had been the political vehicle for the introduction of conscription in the First World War – had worked to hand the Liberals a huge majority in Quebec, equal to one-third of their overall seats. In that both the Liberals and Conservatives opposed conscription for overseas service at this point, it is probable that the majority of the population did not favour this option at this time.
The response of the Canada’s
federal government to the events in France in spring 1940 was to pass the National
Resources Mobilization Act (“NMRA”) on June 22. Although the government had been re-elected
on the promise to not conscript for overseas service, there was recognition
that some sort of mobilization for the purposes of the war was now necessary. In the words of King, the NRMA did “…confer
upon the government special emergency powers to mobilize all our human and
material resources for the defense of Canada.”
Further, he added, “Let me emphasize the fact that this registration
will have nothing whatsoever to do with the recruitment of men for overseas
service.” He made this promise
even more explicitly to Quebec on Saint-Jean Baptiste Day, June 24, 1940. While opposing conscription for overseas
service, Quebec generally accepted the plan for conscription for the defense of
Canada.
The matter of conscription may be considered mostly settled for about a year following the introduction of the NRMA, although pressure for conscription grew throughout 1941. The situation changes dramatically with the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and their range of military victories throughout Southeast Asia and the Central Pacific immediately thereafter.
On 9 December, 1941, in light of Japanese success, and in consideration of some 2,000 Canadian soldiers stationed at Hong Kong, King asked his Ministers specifically about conscription. Those from Quebec were opposed; those from elsewhere in Canada were mixed, thus demonstrating a growing cleavage that King sought to avoid. After hearing the opinions of his Ministers, King stated that he thought that conscription was ill-advised as it would disrupt the unity of Canada, and it would hurt the war effort.
Arthur Meighen, an ardent pro-conscription Tory, and author of the conscription legislation in the First World War, had been made Conservative Leader in November, 1941. In an attempt to get into the House of Commons, he fought and lost a by-election in York South on February 9, 1942. In his by-election bid he ran on a platform of “total war”, including a national government and the immediate introduction of conscription for overseas service. His defeat was engineered by King, who refused to run a Liberal candidate in the by-election, thereby concentrating the entire anti-Conservative vote in the CCF candidate. Another factor in Meighen’s defeat was the CCF platform of social security which had resonated with the working class voters of the riding.
Regardless of Meighen’s defeat, his call for both conscription and a coalition government enjoyed growing support. In early 1942, 200 leading citizens from Toronto (the “Toronto 200”) placed full-page ads in newspaper across the province demanding coalition and conscription. As well, the legislature in Manitoba, and the premier of New Brunswick demanded conscription for overseas service. Although he lost, the effect of the Meighen campaign, coupled with the various disasters suffered by the Allied cause in the Pacific, was to bring force King to hold a plebiscite on conscription, on April 27, 1942.
As noted, toward the end of 1941, support for conscription had been growing in English Canada. In November 1941, for example, a Gallup Poll put support across Canada for conscription for overseas service at 60%. By February of 1942, as second Gallop Poll showed that 78% of English-speaking Canadians now supported for conscription for overseas service. By the time of the Plebiscite of April 27, 1942, Allied forces had suffered defeat across the Pacific, in Russia, and in North Africa – in fact, the first half of 1942 was the nadir of Allied fortunes. The only bright spot in the first months of 1942 was the Battle of the Coral Sea in March, which temporarily stopped Japanese Southern expansion, and was fought to a tactical draw by the United States Navy.
On April 27, 1942, Canadians were
asked the following question: “Are you in favour of releasing the Government
from any obligations arising out of any past commitments restricting the
methods of raising men for military service?”
The clear political intent was to release King and his government from
their earlier pledge to not send conscripts overseas, without having to call a
general election on the issue.
In the event, the plebiscite resulted in a vote of 64.5% (2,921,206) outside of Quebec in favour of permitting the government a free hand regarding conscription, versus 72.1% (971,925) within the province who were opposed. Of the French-speaking population in Quebec, 85% were opposed. A closer analysis of the results revealed that French-Canadians and non-Anglo-Saxons across Canada had voted heavily against conscription, while English-Canadians everywhere had voted for it, reflecting an English Canada versus everyone else phenomena. The challenge to Canadian unity at this time was obvious, and much depended on the government’s response.
That response was embedded in the most famous phase ever attributed to Mackenzie King. The phrase “conscription if necessary, but not necessarily conscription”, which constituted the essence of the government’s response to the plebiscite result, was actually “borrowed” from an editorial in the Toronto Star of April 28, 1942. Rather than introduce conscription for overseas service, what came about instead was the repeal of the section of the National Resources Mobilization Act forbidding conscription for overseas service (Section 3), coupled with the government’s promise to continue to try to make sure that this step would never actually be necessary. While acceptable to the majority of his Cabinet ministers, this limited response caused the Minister of Defence, Ralston, to actually draft and tender a letter of resignation, although he did not, in fact, end up resigning.
By Bill 80, the NMRA was amended to allow conscripts to be send anywhere outside of the Western Hemisphere, as long as Parliament was again consulted. One may note that by limiting sending conscript to outside the Western Hemisphere, the government in effect permitted conscripts to be employed off Canadians soil, as long as they were still in the Americas. In fact, a brigade of NMRA men was actually trained and employed in the Aleutians campaign in 1943.
Other than the Dieppe and Hong Kong disasters in December 1941 and April 1942, the Canadian Army in Europe stayed on the sidelines until July of 1943 when it went into action in Sicily - four years after its arrival in Europe. The Canadian Army had been kept out of sustained combat during this time because there was a desire on the part of the government to avoid high casualties at all costs. Obviously behind this was a concern to avoid the need for conscription for overseas service.
The period between the invasion of Sicily, and mid-summer of 1944, may therefore be considered the quietest period with respect to the issue of conscription during the war, simply because this invasion did not result in casualties heavy enough to stimulate a demand for conscription, and no Canadian military activity elsewhere threatened to do so either. In essence, the plebiscite, coupled with King’s assertion that conscription would only come “if necessary”, served to buy the government over a year of relative peace regarding this issue, during which time no one could argue that conscription for overseas service was actually necessary. The matter had again been successfully managed by King’s government. In spite of the formation of various political organizations in Quebec opposed to conscription, such the Ligue pour la defence du Canada and the its successor, the Bloc Populaire Canadiens, Canada remained united, and the discord apparent during the First World War was not repeated.
“Necessity” would collide with
political reality in the fall of 1944.
During September of 1944, reports had started to appear in the press
about a lack of reinforcements for the army, and about the lack of training of
some of the replacements. In
mid-September 1944 Conn Smythe, the Toronto hockey magnate who had been wounded
fighting in Normandy, and who was in hospital in Canada recovering from wounds
received in France, began a personal campaign advocating for more trained
reinforcement for the Canadian Army. On
September 19, 1944, the Globe and Mail stated as follows:
The reinforcement situation which he (i.e. Smythe)
described in his statement will be a severe shock to many people, especially to
the parents and families of our fighting men in Italy and France, and those who
have relied on defense Minister Ralston’s repeated assurances that the Canadian
Army had adequate reserves of trained reinforcements
…They come at a time when Canadians are engaged in heavy fighting,
casualties for which have not yet been reported. The implications are clear to the least
informed citizen.
Minister of Defence, Colonel Ralston was concerned enough about this issue to go to Europe to investigate the matter himself. When he returned on October 18, 1944 he reported his findings to King and to the War Committee, emphasizing that 15,000 reinforcements were needed immediately to bring the establishments up to normal.
King’s nightmare scenario had arrived. His management of the issue during the following weeks was brilliant and ruthless; duplicitous and Machiavellian; and, from the point of view of national unity, entirely successful. In short, King portrayed himself as a friend of anti-conscriptionists by destroying its main proponent in Cabinet – Colonel Ralston - while at the same time portraying himself as a friend of conscriptionists by actually introducing compulsion for overseas service, but only after attempting to make the voluntary system work one last time.
One day after Ralston returned from Europe, King planned for Ralston’s replacement by General McNaughton, who was known to be a strong believer in the volunteer army. By October 31, 1944 McNaughton had agreed to take Ralston’s place, on the promise that he would try to make the volunteer army work. At the Cabinet meeting the next day, King effectively fired Ralston using the pretext of the resignation letter that Ralston had delivered during the post-plebiscite period as his rationale. McNaughton then became Minister of Defence. This happened so quickly, and with so little warning, that other pro-conscriptionists in cabinet were caught off guard, and none left cabinet to make a stand with Ralston. Up to this point, unity had been preserved, at least within the government.
General McNaughton was sworn in on November 2, 1944. Within weeks, he admitted failure on drumming up required volunteers. As a pretext for introducing conscription for overseas service, King managed to convince himself that this failure to find reinforcements represented, not a failure by his government, but a “plot by the generals” who were, he thought, frustrating efforts to make the voluntary system work
On November 22, 1944, McNaughton announced that the government intended to send 16,000 NMRA men overseas, subject to the approval of Parliament. The approval was forthcoming, with 143 MPs voting for, and 70 against, with 34 Quebec Liberals amongst the dissenters. In the event, almost 13,000 conscripts were sent overseas, of which 69 were killed. The decision to send conscripts overseas sparked disturbances in Montreal, Quebec City and a few smaller Quebec communities, though no deaths resulted. In Terrace, British Columbia, a brigade of conscripts mutinied for a week before being persuaded to submit.
Still, the more wide-spread and deadly riots and disunity that
greeted the introduction of conscription during the previous war were not
repeated. As Jack Granatstein wrote,
“The essential unity between French and English speaking Canadians had held
together, at least in the Liberal Party, and the sundering of racial peace had
been preserved.” The successful
management of the crisis played a significant role in, King’s re-election on
June 11, 1945, when his party won 125 seats compared to 67 for the Conservatives,
28 for the CCF and 13 for Social Credit.
As if to underscore his achievement in keeping the country united, even
after the introduction of conscription King took 47 of 65 seats in Quebec.
The political dominance of the issue of conscription, both among French- and English-Canadians, was plainly evident not only at the national, but also in the local political culture and debate in Ottawa. This becomes clear from a review the city’s three major newspaper: Le Droit, The Ottawa (Evening) Citizen; and The Ottawa Journal.
In terms of its approach, this paper will rely heavily on editorial content from these three newspapers. In that sense, the newspapers will be treated not only as having reported on the political debate over conscription, but as having actually constituted the essence of the debate itself through their various editorials, which arguably constitutes the best window upon the various shades of local public opinion. In fact, there was little other formal, public argument or discussion beyond the newspapers themselves. For example, a review of the Minutes of the Council of the Corporation of the City of Ottawa during World War Two reveals no record whatsoever of a discussion about conscription.
Having said that, newspapers can not reflect the totality of political life of any community, and must be treated carefully when used as historic evidence. In short, “…historians must recognize the limits of newspapers as evidence, and use them appropriately.”
First and foremost, newspapers are limited in that they are business operations that must sell in order to survive, and to grow. This business aspect may distort reporting in the direction of the scandalous and profane, and away from the mundane. The need to sell may drive content that is more exaggerated than is apparent in the community, all with the purpose of building readership.
Further, newspapers may also try to reflect not only the opinions of their audiences, but they may also try to change public opinion to suit the biases of their editors, owners, and occasionally, advertisers and patrons as well.
Finally, newspapers also use a particular type of discourse, both in terms of what they report, and in terms of the editorial page. Because what will be looked at are editorials written for specific audiences, within certain limited circumstances “…much of what is ‘meant’ when an utterance is realized either in text or in talk is implicit, and the hearers or readers have to make a certain amount of effort to interpret what might have been intended, using many contextual cues and mutually-shared knowledge.” The attempt to interpret the various editorials, and to breathe meaning into what was written six decades ago, is the essence of most of this paper.
This paper is organized into three main parts. The first concerns the time frame from March 1939 up to just before the attack on Pearl Harbor; the second concentrates on the plebiscite period, which ran from about December, 1941 to July 1942; and finally, from the post-plebiscite period to the introduction of conscription in late, 1944.
What seems clear from the reporting during the war is that the press in Ottawa was not so much bitterly divided, as bitterly engaged when it came to the issue of conscription. When conscription finally came, Ottawa did not experience the riots noted above in Montreal, nor the rebellion of sorts noted in British Columbia. The fact that most people in the city worked for the federal government, and voted for the Liberal Party may have had something to do to with this relatively passive response, as noted above.
Within all three newspapers, however, King’s policies were invariably opposed. While there was a measure of editorial consensus on the issue of conscription prior to Pearl Harbor, it is hard to attribute this to the policies of King. Prior to May of 1940, the issue simply did not loom large enough to vigorously divide editorial opinion in the city, and after June of 1940, the terrible events of that summer served to frighten all concerned into a “consensus driven by events” over the NRMA. Later, the plebiscite seriously divided editorial opinion, with no paper supporting the chosen mechanism of a plebiscite. Finally, the invocation of conscription in November of 1944 was utterly divisive, with the English press supporting the government’s conscription policy of the first time during the war, and the French press bitterly resenting that same policy, and predicting disunity after the war.
Besides responding the policies
of the government, the editors of the three newspapers often took to responding
to each other’s editorials in order to make this point or that about the issue,
with these responses often degrading to the pint of insults and worse.
The issue of conscription dominated the editorial pages in Ottawa like no other - sixty years later, it makes for fascinating reading. Within those pages one can find a microcosm of an entire national debate; the most important national debate during Canada‘s most important war. Rather than one small part of a larger whole, this Ottawa debate was, in effect, the entire national debate in miniature. Ottawa is the nation’s capital. From March of 1939 to November of 1944, in the editorial pages of its leading dailies, it also accurately reflected the nation’s soul.
A Conscription Consensus
For the Citizen, the
problem in March 1939 was not so much Germany as an invader, but the idea of
Hitler and what he represented. Clues as
to why this is so appear in a March 17, 1939 editorial regarding
Czechoslovakia, called The Old Order Cannot Win, in which the Citizen
stated that,
Once more it is being demonstrated to the world that the
old order, designed for economies of scarcity, cannot hope to survive against
the bolder revolutionary forces of National Socialism and fascism. Germany’s move into Czecho-Slovakia has
nullified much of Great Britain’s rearmament effort of the last year.
The editorial continued and
stated that,
The way has to be found under democracy to make better
use of national productive resources, even to surpass the use of Germany’s and
Italy’s resources under National Socialism and Fascism. Canada could lead the way, but it will never
be done by a Canadian parliament under the old order. There has to be more vision in Canadian
leadership than there is in Communism, Nazi of Fascist leadership.
The events in Czechoslovakia were
seen by The Ottawa Citizen through the eyes of hopeful democratic
social and economic revolutionaries.
While neither fascist nor communist, the Citizen was certainly
not a supporter of the political, economic or social status quo. For this newspaper, and presumably for its
readers, the predominant issue was not so much military aggression, the future
of the British Empire, or even war. The
primary issue was “Hitler” as representative of successful revolutionary change
where such change was desired, but the methods of Nazis and Fascists were
not. Given the experience of the
Depression, this may be understandable.
From 1921 to 1941, the census had revealed that fully two-thirds of
Canadians lived in poverty.
Le Droit saw this
event is a rather different light. Far
from exhibiting outrage, Le Droit saw the events in Europe more as
events to be reported. Prior to
reporting on March 15, 1939 that Bohemia and Moravia had become Reich
protectorates, as noted above, the headline for March 14, 1939 proclaimed that,
“Il N’y A Plus De Tcheco-Slovaquie” (i.e. “Czechoslovakia is no more”),
and “Les Slovaques se sont constitutes en etat independent” (i.e. “the Slovaks
now constitute an independent state”.)
Compared to the other two Ottawa papers, which used words like “smashed”
(Citizen – March 15, 1939), and “death of a nation” (Journal –
March 15, 1939) to describe what happened to Czechoslovakia, the reporting in Le
Droit seems entirely matter-of-fact.
Le Droit’s specific
opinion on the issue of Czechoslovakia was disseminated in its editorial for
March 15, 1939 called Les Eventements Se Precipitent (i.e. “The events
thrown into”.) For Le Droit, the
threat extending from events in Czechoslovakia were related to questions that
were internal to Czechoslovakia itself, into which Germany had intervened in a
way that was “rapide, brutale meme…” According to the editors of Le
Droit, what had happened in mid-March, 1939 was a matter of Germany taking
advantage of an opportunity inherent in the political divisiveness within
Czechoslovakia. While there may be some
truth in this, it is suggested that such an opinion, in that it did not include
a judgment about the wrongness of this action, would certainly have been seen
as lacking amongst the English-speaking population in Ottawa at the time.
More interesting was Le Droit’s
editorial of March 22, 1939 wherein Editor Camille L’Heureux discussed certain
remarks made by Prime Minister King to the effect that, should London be bombed
by German forces, then the entire Commonwealth would be at war. Le Droit took the position that this
contradicted King’s earlier remarks that the decision to go to war would be up
to Parliament. The paper concluded by noting that, “D’après ce qui se passé, le Canada est
destine à participer a la prochaine aventure impériale.” In essence,
the editors of Le Droit were of the opinion that, no matter what King
said about Parliament deciding the issue, Canada would find itself involved in
this next war, with the war itself being an “imperial adventure”.
Ultimately, what Le Droit
provided its readers with was an excellent description of what happened in
Europe in March of 1939, exhibiting an attitude and detachment similar to what
an academic could have written well after the fact. There is much to be recommended in this
approach in that it may inspire a more rational reaction to world events. However, that this vision of European events,
in that it is truly detached, also bespeaks of an editorial board that was
itself somewhat detached from world events and pre-occupied with the domestic
life of the community. In particular,
the perception that this was merely a British imperial matter - as was the
First World War - could not be more obvious.
Along with this perception was a palatable distrust of any promises by
federal politicians relating to what this community feared the most, which was
a new internal oppression in the guise of compulsory military service.
The Ottawa Journal was certainly
not detached from world events, especially from the British impression of those
events, and official British government policy.
On March 8, 1939 for example, and prior to the German move on Czechoslovakia,
The Ottawa Journal commented on a planned expansion in the American,
British and French air forces, and on British foreign policy, as follows,
…German air superiority, if it exists at the present time
at all, must soon become inferior to that of the democracies…Also, it
vindicates or completes the vindication of the Munich policy of Mr.
Chamberlain. War last September might
have found the democratic countries inferior to Germany in power in the
air. That might not have meant defeat;
it most certainly would have meant desperate loss in the beginning, at best a
long war. Today, because of delay,
German superiority has dwindled, with the certainty that as time goes on it
will continue to dwindle…
From the perspective of The
Ottawa Journal’s participation in the coming conscription debate, an
earlier editorial makes even clearer The Ottawa Journal’s almost slavish
adherence to official British foreign policy and antipathy to the Liberal
government of Mackenzie King. On March
3, 1939 The Ottawa Journal accused King of not being consistent with
British foreign policy. More than that,
the paper went on to essentially accused King, of all world leaders, of not
being enough of an appeaser – appeasement being official British foreign policy
at the time. It is worth
noting that on March 15, 1939, this same paper wondered why Canada was not
standing lock-step with England in defending democracy, and urged the
government of King to get active.
In 1939, therefore, Ottawa was
home to three unique journalistic vehicles.
In terms of their opinions regarding the war and the conscription issue,
these three papers remained remarkably consistent from 1939 to 1944.
Canada declared war on Germany on
September 10, 1939. As noted in the
review of the political history of conscription above, both at the end of
March, 1939 and two days before Canada’s declaration of war, Prime Minister
King stood in the House of Commons and assured the nation that there would be
no conscription for overseas service during the coming war. This position was supported by the
Conservative Leader of the time, Dr. Manion, who declared on March 27, 1939
that he did not believe, “…that Canadian youth should be conscripted to fight
outside the borders of Canada.” Initial
reactions in Ottawa’s three main newspapers to King’s strategy were mildly
favourable, if also largely non-committal and somewhat cynical. These reactions follow in turn, starting with
The Ottawa Citizen.
On April 1, 1939 the Citizen
commented on King’s first declaration against conscription for overseas service
on March 31, 1939 as follows,
Mr. King rejected conscription of men for overseas
service. In so doing he waylaid an issue
that has caused some distress – but only until the time comes to put the
precept into practice. Once more it may
be suggested that while in theory this policy is supportable, when put to a
test it will prove unworkable if the logical corollary of compulsory service at
home is accepted.
The Citizen therefore
supported King’s policy in theory, but noted that it would prove problematic
once the concept of compulsory service at home was accepted. The Citizen also opposed conscription
solely for service within Canada considering that this would prove unworkable
in times of war, as it meant a divided defence force with some units devoted to
home defence while others went overseas or wherever required for service.
Regarding the politics of
conscription, which saw both major political parties opposing conscription for
overseas service in March, 1939 the Citizen noted that, “…the muddled
conscription policy of the Liberal and Conservative parties should be
avoided…it is another example…of the political opportunism of both
parties.”
On April 26, 1939, the Citizen
further explained why it thought the Prime Minister and Leader of the
Opposition had both come out against conscription as follows, “Both Prime
Minister King and Dr. Manion for the Conservative party have said that they are
opposed to it for service outside Canada and in doing so they supposed they had
appeased young Quebec and other demonstrators.”
Beyond pointing out the need to
appease Quebec, and regarding the link between war and Canada’s political and
economic system, the Citizen went so far as to say that,
Eventually the people in some civilized country, it may
be in Canada, will refuse to follow then old negative parties in politics and
defeatist advisers behind government, along this path of scarcity….they will
deny the necessity of tightening belts in Canada because Germany is invading
Czecho-Slovakia or because Italy is demanding colonial territory from
France.
The Citizen’s initial
opinion regarding conscription, as expressed as early as April of 1939 was
complex, including a mixture of political cynicism, concern for social,
economic and political change, and a grudging, if temporary support for King’s
first policy stance. Within the paper’s
opinion one can find the seeds of a later call for “unity of sacrifice” given
that, should conscription ever be considered necessary, the Citizen
would presumably not support conscription only for service within Canada, but
abroad as well. In fact, other than
supporting King’s policy “in theory”, the Citizen actually avoided
either supporting or opposing the specific imposition of conscription for
overseas service outright at this time.
Le Droit had a very
well thought-out response to the promises of both Prime Minister King and Dr.
Manion to not conscript for overseas service in the event of war. In short, Le Droit, recounting the
memory of the Great War and the promises of Borden and Laurier, assumed that
these men were sincere, but that conscription would come in any event. It specifically wrote that,
Comme M. King aussi, il ne croit pas
a la nécessite de la conscription au Canada dans le prochain conflit important
de l’Angleterre. Le chef du gouvernement
et celui de l’opposition sont sans doute sincères. Mais sir Wilfred Laurier et sir Robert Borden
étaient également sincères, le 17 janvier 1916, lorsqu’ils se prononçaient tous
deux contre la conscription.
In the opinion of Le Droit,
loyalty to Britain would propel Canada into war, and that involvement would
eventually lead to conscription. It was
not that they did not welcome the declaration against conscription; they just
did not believe it.
More than that, the editors of Le
Droit believed that the assumption that “when Britain is at war, Canada is
also at war” was, in light of the Statue of Westminster, 1931, simply
wrong. They believed that this
assumption was itself at the root of what would be an eventual invocation of
conscription, and that, “Cette politique est extremement dangereuse pour les
interests et l’ unité du Canada.”
The Ottawa Journal commented on
King’s and Manion’s first declaration against conscription for overseas service
as follows:
Mr. King and Dr. Manion agreed on the essential truth
that when Britain is at war, Canada is at war…nor need there be concern over
the declarations against conscription.
Conscription has nothing to do with the principle of Canadian unity with
the Empire in time of war; it is merely a method of war. Moreover, no one can say in advance whether,
in any war, conscription would be necessary or desirable…in a word,
conscription is something we are not called upon to deal with now.
The Journal therefore
downplayed the issue of conscription, preferring instead to make an essential
point about Canada’s obligations in the event that Britain went to war. In this, the Journal was supported by
the Citizen, which noted that, “When Great Britain is at war, however,
Canada is at war.” As noted, this
assumption was the very essence of the conscription debate for Le Droit. It was this assumption, and what it would
eventually lead to in terms of declaration of war, that constituted the great divide
between political cultures in Ottawa in March, 1939.
What of conscription itself? One may note that The Ottawa Journal,
much like the Citizen, actually chose to not express an opinion
regarding the need for conscription in March of 1939, choosing instead to await
developments. Consensus from March of
1939, until the declaration of war in September on the issue of conscription
stemmed from the fact that the question of whether or not to go to war
predominated at this point. Division
over the issue of conscription would not manifest itself until Canada was actually
involved in the hostilities.
As has been noted, King made a
second promise to not conscript for overseas service prior to Canada
declaration of war on September 10, 1939.
The period of time immediately before and after the actual declaration
of war made clear the various differing opinions regarding conscription within
the three major papers in Ottawa. The
declaration of war was a central focal point where the three differing
newspapers in the city started to process of outlining their respective
positions regarding the issue; positions that barely changed throughout the
war. It therefore warrants particularly
close attention.
On September 9, 1939 The
Ottawa Citizen came out in favour of conscription, not just of manpower,
but of the “money and production” as well.
Consistent with its political cynicism, it continued to blame both of
the major political parties for bungling the conscription issue, as follows,
At present, the Conservative are conniving with the
Liberals in the old way of muddling through.
They lack the unanimity to give leadership, but would rather let the
nation drift deeper at tragic cost before taking the realist stand of
conscription as it must eventually be taken to meet the challenge of
totalitarian war.
Like Le Droit commenting
the previous March, the Citizen considered that conscription for
overseas service was inevitable. Unlike Le
Droit, the Citizen did not see the cause of this as being an
imperialist war, but the totalitarian nature of the coming war, which would
presumably demand all of the country’s resources as it was demanding all the
resources of Canada’s future enemies.
The day before, as a precursor to
its declaration in favour of full conscription, the Citizen had outlined
certain reasons for supporting conscription for overseas service. On September 8, 1939, the paper noted that
the torpedoing of the Athena meant that Canada was an obvious target for
German hostility, and therefore properly a participant in the coming war. As regards conscription, it continued and
stated that,
It is neither just nor efficient, however, to leave the
enlistment of men to voluntary recruiting.
In effect it is facing the brunt of national defence on thousands of
Canadian young men hitherto unemployed….a just process of drafting men should
be provided for during the present emergency session of parliament, before the
streams of unemployed are dried up or the urge to volunteer has passed from the
process of moral suasion to the process of coercive pressure – as it did before
Canada finally turned to the Military Service Act in 1917.
The concern for the unemployed
expressed in this editorial is completely consistent with the Citizen’s
preference for social, economic and political change. Like Le Droit, the Citizen had
also learned from the First World War experience of conscription. Unlike Le Droit which thought that the
previous war had shown that conscription should be avoided, The Ottawa
Citizen had learned that considerations of justice and equity demanded that
it be introduced immediately upon the declaration of war.
The Citizen was not blind
to the arguments of French Canada as regards conscription, but dealt with them
from the perspective of the political system with which it had so many
concerns. Specifically, it noted that,
Failure on the part of the government to set up national
service in Canada to make the most effective use of finance, industry and
manpower may impose a breaking strain on the national structure. Conscription may be the test of Canada’s
nationhood – as the draft law demonstrated nationhood when the United States
entered the last war. Conservatives have
no more faith that Liberals, apparently, in the national unity of Canada at
this time of test by the ordeal of battle…A year of muddling through, however, or
perhaps in less time, parliament may be persuaded to take the way of national
service.
The response of the Citizen
to the concerns of French Canada, as outlined in the editorial pages of Le
Droit, was subtly touched upon in this editorial in the reference to “the
national unity of Canada”. In short, in
the opinion of the Citizen, national unity should be strong enough to
withstand French Canadian concerns, and Liberals and Conservatives lacked the
political will to reveal this essential truth.
It is again worth emphasizing
that the Citizen, rather than supporting conscription for overseas
service, also actively opposed its alternative – the voluntary system. It stated that, “Obviously a united defence
force cannot be built up in Canada with some units liable to be sent abroad
while others could refuse to serve in the event of the Canadian defensive front
being outside the three-mile limit.”
This is consistent with the Citizen’s opinion regarding
conscription as enunciated in March, 1939.
Te Citizen therefore
supported conscription for overseas service as: an equitable sharing of the
burden between rich and poor unemployed men; as part of a wider recruitment of
“money” as well as manpower; because it considered the alternative voluntary
system, which would segregate those who would serve overseas from those who
would not, as unworkable; and finally, as a reflection of the paper’s belief
that only a total effort would defeat the totalitarian forces arrayed against
the Allies. Like the editors at Le Droit, it considered that the
introduction of conscription was inevitable.
Le Droit not only
opposed conscription for overseas service, but in September, 1939 it also
opposed Canada’s entry into the war. In
fact, its entire series of editorials immediately preceding the declaration of
war can be read as an expanding argument for Canadian neutrality in the face of
war, and therefore, against conscription.
First and foremost, Le Droit
considered that Canada’s entry into the war was basically inevitable, as it had
noted the previous spring. On September
1, 1939, for example, the editors of Le Droit wrote that,
Le gouvernement convoque le
parlement pour le 7 septembre. A moins
que la situation ne change en Europe d’ici la – ce qui est improbable – le
parlement canadien se réunira donc dans une semaine environ…si l’Angleterre est
entraînée dans le conflit imminent, il n’y a pas de doute que le Canada suivra
son exemple. Le gouvernement actuel est
participationniste.
Le Droit later questioned Canada’s actual
responsibility as regards world events as follows,
Dans ce conflit imminent, quelle est
la part de responsabilité du Canada? Il
est puéril de le demander. Sa
responsabilité est nulle. Le Canada n’à
jamais signe une alliance militaire avec la Pologne et il aurait été ridicule
qu’il en fût autrement. Si le Canada se
met en ce moment sur un pied de guerre, ce n’est pas en vertu d’alliances ou
d’obligations précises, mais simplement parce que le gouvernement actuel,
malgré le statut de Westminster, prétend que, lorsque l’Angleterre est en
guerre, le Canada l’est aussi.
Le Droit’s questioning
of Canada’s responsibilities in the event of war lead to a call for Canada to
follow the American lead and to declare neutrality. The editorial of September 4, 1939
stated as follows,
Inutile de répéter, une fois de
plus, que nous n’approuvons pas le hâte du Canada d’entrer dans ce conflit…Nous
préférons de beaucoup l’attitude que le président Roosevelt tient, cette
attitude aurait du être celle du Canada.
Parlant hier soir a la radio, le chef du gouvernement américain a
déclare que les Etats-Unis proclameront leur neutralité…
Thus far Le Droit had
addressed the issue of conscription by arguing against Canada’s involvement in
the war. Immediately following the
editorial of September 4, 1939 Le Droit changed tactics and moved
directly to the issue of conscription itself.
Le Droit’s editorial
for September 5, 1939, started by noting that various utterances by King
regarding the inevitability of war had made it clear that Canada would reject
neutrality. The paper then moved on to
question whether, in the event of war, a voluntary system would actually be
instituted for overseas service, this in spite of public promises to that
effect. Given King’s earlier promise of
march, 1939 that conscription for overseas service would not be instituted in
the event of war, this editorial is consistent with Le Droit’s deep
cynicism about the believability of any political promises to not conscript.
Le Droit’s editorial
for September 6, 1939 continued the argument against conscription by noting the
mounting pressure on the government to institute conscription immediately upon
a declaration of war. In response to
this pressure, Le Droit emphasized that such a policy would lead to
disunity, as it would see a majority impose its will on an unwilling
minority. In the words of the Le Droit editorialist, Camille L’heureux, “La
volonté brutale du nombre l’emporte presque toujours.” In essence, Le Droit expressed the opinion that
French Canada had everything to lose should conscription for overseas service
be imposed.
On September 7, 1939, Le Droit
continued its anti-conscription argument by moving on to consideration of the
need for an expeditionary force in the event of war. Obviously, with no Canadian expeditionary
force, the need for conscription would be essentially non-existent as it was
most likely that volunteers could cover any contingency. The editorial ended by noting that unity
depended on the government’s response to war being in proportion to Canada’s
actual interests and needs, as follows,
Le premier ministre a fait appel à
l’unité du people canadien. Cette unité
peut être préservée a condition que le gouvernement et le parlement n’imposent
pas à la population des mesures qui ne sont pas proportionnées à nos besoins et
qui sont inspirées par le souci de préserver des intérêts qui ne sont pas…
As noted earlier, on September 8,
1939 Prime Minister King announced in Parliament that there would be no
conscription for overseas service should Parliament approve Canada’s entry into
the war, which it did two days later. In
response, and as if to underscore the importance of this promise to French
Canada, Le Droit ran a headline on September 9, 1939 which read, Pas
De Conscription which was as large as the headline used by Le Droit
to announce the war itself earlier in September.
Le Droit’s response to
King’s promise, and to Canada’s declaration of war, was contained in two
editorials on September 11th and 12th, 1939. The first of these recounted in detail the
new war policy of the Liberal government.
Le Droit, in particular, emphasized the apparent understanding
of King regarding this policy,
emphasizing that King had stated that he did not believe that conscription for
overseas service was necessary or efficient, as follows,
Il ne croit pas, d’autre part, que
la conscription des Canadiens pour le service d’outre-mer soit nécessaire ni
qu’elle soit une mesure efficace. Le
premier ministre a promis que le présent gouvernement ne proposera point de
conscription. Voila, en ses grandes
lignes, le politique militaire du ministère King dans le présent conflit.
The second editorial went on at
length to question Canada’s involvement in the war – in essence, Le Droit
closed out what was a week-long argument against conscription by returning to
its original point. The editorial
started out by emphasizing that Canada had no real interest in this war, by
virtue of the fact that Canada was a North American country,
Si le Canada était une nation
véritablement indépendante, s’il ne faisait pas partie du Commonwealth des
nations britanniques, il est évident que son gouvernement, quelles que soient
ses couleurs et ses sympathies, agirait, dans le conflit actuel comme toutes
les autres nations de l’Amérique du nord et de l’Amérique du sud…il est
ridicule en effet de prétendre que le Canada, considère uniquement comme pays
d’Amérique, est plus menace, que les Etats-Unis dans sa sécurité…
The editorial continued and noted
that, in the opinion of Canada’s political leaders, when Britain was at war
Canada was also at war, this in accordance with perceptions of imperial
solidarity and perceptions of unity between similar people with similar institutions. In response to this, the editorial noted
that, “Cette opinion n’est pas partagé par tous les canadiens…”
Le Droit ended its
campaign against Canada’s involvement in the war, and against conscription in
its September 12, 1939, editorial with a warning, as follows, ”L’heure est
grave et elle exige de nos chefs politiques une extrême prudence dont ils ne
devront jamais se départir.”
For Le Droit then, the
imposition of conscription for overseas service represented “everything” –
essentially, the ultimate oppression of the French minority by the English
majority. In their evolving series of
arguments, the editors first argued that Canada had no interest in this war,
and that it should be remain neutral.
When that was obviously not going to happen, Le Droit argued for
a limited participation, and the avoidance of an expeditionary force. The obvious purpose behind a limited
participation was to limit the possibility of conscription owing to excessive
casualties.
Once Canada had actually entered
the war, albeit with a promise of no conscription for overseas service, Le
Droit ended what was in effect a week-long editorial argument with a
warning to Canada’s leaders to exercise extreme prudence. Clearly, while recognizing the government’s
attempt at compromise inherent in the no conscription pledge, Le Droit
did not think this promise was sufficient, nor did they trust that it was
real.
If Le Droit questioned
Canada’s interest in the war and suggested neutrality, The Ottawa Journal
reported and commented on world events in late August and early September, 1939
almost as a mouth-piece of the British Empire itself. In essence, its editorial commentary from
this period actually had very little to do with Canada as a separate entity,
and appears to have simply assumed that Canada mattered only to the extent that
it was British. From the perspective of
the conscription debate, if Le Droit was entirely open in its opposition
and the Citizen came out in favour of full conscription, the Journal
was far more circumspect in its support, never actually calling for
conscription during this period of time, but certainly hinting at it.
The Journal’s editorial of
August 28, 1939, entitled, The Fight Goes On For Peace And Decency,
noted that Hitler realized that the days of his bloodless conquests were
over. It concluded its commentary by
noting that,
The British Empire understands that Poland is but a
symbol, that there is more than Danzig and the Corridor at stake. The issue is the preservation of democracy;
the saving of our right to live as free men and women. Life in a world dominated by Hitler would not
be worth living.
Obviously, this is almost the
exact opposite of the sentiments expressed by Le Droit, which considered
that a European world dominated by Hitler to be none of Canada’s business. As well, it is interesting to note that the Journal
treated the matter of war as a life and death matter, as had Le Droit
treated the issue of conscription.
On August 30, 1939 the Journal,
in making a case for Canada’s involvement in the war, outlined what it saw as
the lessons of the First World War in an editorial entitled A Moral From
1914. We have seen that both the Citizen
and Le Droit also drew lessons from the earlier war, the Citizen
seeing the need to invoke conscription immediately, and Le Droit
learning exactly the opposite lesson.
The Journal also looked to lessons from that previous conflict,
and quoted at length a commentary from the Globe and Mail concerning
those same lessons.
The essence of the Globe and
Mail’s commentary, as quoted in the Journal, was that having
essentially paid whatever “’just debts’” may have been owed to Germany
following the Treaty of Versailles, appeasement was now at an end. The “moral of 1914” to be learned was that,
in the words of the Globe and Mail, “’Mankind can see far enough to
realize that permanent peace is possible only when the aggressors make the
plea.’” The Journal therefore
saw the events of 1939 as an extension of the1914-1918 conflict, with Germany
seen as an unrepentant aggressor that could only be brought to heel through
another war.
The Second World War, for the
British Empire, started with Britain’s declaration of war on September 1,
1939. For the Journal, there was
never any question of Canada’s involvement, or of Canada’s obligations to
Britain. On September 2, 1939 the Journal
editorial stated that,
War has come.
Canada is in it, no question about that. Let us hope for vigorous and
intelligent leadership. So far, the
indication of leadership has not been comforting; but let that pass – it is not
a time to criticize the Dominion Government, if one can help it. But as war has come, and we are in it along
with the rest of the British Commonwealth of nations, the only common sense is
the most prompt and vigorous action possible to assist to our utmost in the
common British fight.
The complete contrast with Le
Droit is obvious. It is suggested
that inherent in this call for maximum effort on Britain’s behalf can perhaps
be read a subtle call for conscription, which, from a manpower perspective, is
the real meaning of a “prompt and vigorous” effort.
On September 6, 1939 The
Ottawa Journal called for consideration of a union government as the war
progressed stating, “It may well be, therefore, that in time, with this war
continuing, Union or National Government will become desirable…” It is suggested that the fact that a union
government had been the vehicle by which conscription had been imposed during
the First World War would have been understood by the vast majority of the Journal’s
readers. Calling for consideration of
such a government could, again, easily be seen as a subtle pro-conscription
strategy.
Throughout the war, the
editorialists at The Ottawa Citizen, Le Droit, and The Ottawa
Journal not only expressed their various opinions regarding conscription,
but they also occasionally responded to one another in ways that varied from
respectful, to less so. The first
example of this editor to editor discussion occurred when The Ottawa Journal
commented on Le Droit’s call for neutrality, in its editorials of
September 8 and 9, 1939.
In its September 8, 1939
editorial entitled, Opposed To Canadian Action, the Journal first
quoted from the salient points from the previous Le Droit editorial, and
noted that,
The Ottawa French-language daily, Le Droit, had a leading
editorial Monday, a column long under the heading “Canada and the war”
condemning the Dominion Government for letting Canada into it. The article declares that Canada should have
proclaimed neutrality, and says Prime Minister King should have taken the same
course as President Roosevelt…”
The response to the position put
forward by Le Droit came the next day in a Journal editorial
entitled Why This Unreality? in which the Journal stated that,
Perhaps it can make little difference, yet it must seem
to many that all this talk about whether Canada is at war when Great Britain is
at war, or whether we must wait for Parliament to declare war, is just so much
play-acting. Make believe….Canada is in
a state of war; has been in a state of war since the King declared war on
Germany; stands today and has stood fort a week with her shipping, her ports
and harbors and her territory liable to attack by Germany...
The Ottawa Journal further added
that,
Debate over whether Canada has the right or power to stay
neutral in a British war may have been an excellent intellectual exercise, for
constitutionalists and theorists in time of peace. It has no place in our thought now…we are at
war…
If newspapers can be considered
communities talking to themselves, in the case above they constituted one part
of Ottawa’s community carrying on a conversation. This particular conversation intensified with
time.
Regardless of its bellicose
stance, The Ottawa Journal did not openly call for conscription. Hints at support for conscription have been
noted above, however. At times this
subtle call became almost overt. On
September 8, 1939 for example, the Journal’s editorial starts as
follows:
Awaiting the action of Parliament, the majority of the
people of Canada will feel only one conviction and resolution, namely that the
whole strength of this country, whether of men or material, must be thrown into
the war, in whatever way we discover that it can best be done.
If this is a disguised call for
conscription, one must say that it is barely disguised. But for an actual call for conscription, the
pro-conscription sentiment, which is what “the whole strength of this country”
must refer to, is very similar to the opinion expressed in the Citizen which
actually did openly call for conscription.
Later in this same editorial,
however, the Journal remarked that, “As regards man-power, there is one
form of it which will be of supreme importance in this war, namely man-power in
the air. This war will probably be won
in the air.” It went on to note that
neither side in the war could win by land-based military power on its own. This
opinion regarding the importance of air power is also consistent with the Journal’s
call for an expansion in Canadian airplane production, as mentioned
earlier.
While supporting maximum effort
in the war, the Journal’s initial opinion regarding conscription was,
like the Citizen’s, complex. The Journal
did not openly call for conscription at this time, although this was hinted at
repeatedly. The Journal was also
stood lock-step with Britain in 1939, and was in favour of war – a war that the
Journal believed Canada was a part of as soon as Britain was
involved. As noted, this is the exact
opposite opinion to that of Le Droit, an opinion which the Journal
questioned in its editorial of September 8, 1939, thereby initiating a
conversation between the three papers that was to go on for the next five
years.
The title of this section, “The
Conscription Consensus”, describes the state of opinion in the three leading
newspapers in Ottawa regarding the question of conscription at the time of the
declaration of war. Although the three
prominent papers in the city held divergent opinions regarding conscription at
the time of the declaration of war, from that time, through to the attack on
Pearl Harbor, none of them was prepared to elevate the issue to a point where
it became divisive. All three newspapers
were content to await events: the Citizen certain that simple
organizational reality and demands of equity between rich and poor would bring
conscription within a year; Le Droit setting its opposition aside for
the time being, relying on a promise that it did not believe could be kept; and
The Ottawa Journal perhaps looking to air power in tempering what would
eventually become vehement calls for conscription of all available manpower.
This consensus, and the
conscription policy on which it was based, would not last. The events that changed this policy included
the two crucial elections held between declaration of war, and the German
Blitzkrieg in May and June, 1940, which are analyzed next.
Almost immediately following the
declaration of war in September, 1939 a provincial election was called in
Quebec. Within five months of that
election, the federal Liberals faced a federal election in March, 1940.
The Quebec election was closely
watched throughout the country as a gauge of French Canadian sentiment
regarding the war. As has been noted in
the introduction, the result was a triumph for King and the federal Liberals in
that they defeated Maurice Duplessis, who lead a vigorous campaign against the
federal war effort, accusing the Liberals of preferring conscription for
overseas service.
The Ottawa Citizen saw the
Liberal victory in Quebec on October 25, 1939 as evidence of Quebec’s martial
spirit when it came to matters of national security. It noted that,
It is significant that premier Duplessis tried to defeat
the Liberals by declaring that they were for conscription. Messrs. Lapointe, Gardin and Power vehemently
affirmed that they would rather resign from the Dominion cabinet than be
associated with conscription, but agitators were active everywhere trying to
frighten the electorate with talk of conscription. Quebec refused to be frightened….Quebec is
for Canada first, in war or in peace, when it is war for national survival
against the most powerful foe in the history of Christian civilization.
For Le Droit, the Quebec
election was so rent with contradictions and competing agendas that it
considered that it was difficult to draw any conclusions, as follows,
Dans ces circonstances, il sera
difficile de porter un jugement équitable sur le résultat des élections demain.
Que le gouvernement Duplessis soit retourne au pouvoir, cela ne voudra pas dire
nécessairement que la population du Québec condamne le politique de
participation a la guerre. Que M.
Godbout et son parti soient victorieux, il ne faudra pas davantage en conclure
que cette politique de participation est agréée par la majorité.
The circumstances noted above by Le
Droit included the threat by Earnest Lapointe and two other Quebec federal
ministers to resign should Duplessis win, and the simple fact that the
Duplessis government deserved to be judges after three years in office, even
though Duplessis himself had chosen to run against the federal government’s war
policy, rather than on his own record.
In spite of declaring that not
much could be read from this election, Le Droit did actually read much
into it in its editorial for October 26, 1939.
With reference to Duplessis’s battle against the federal government, Le
Droit stated that the electorate in Quebec did not think it wise, from the
perspective of national unity, to take on the government in Ottawa at this
time, as follows, “L’électorat n’a pas cru qu’il était sage de partir en guerre
contre Ottawa, d’élever une barricade entre Quebec et les autres provinces, et
ainsi de mettre en danger l’unité nationale.” Le Droit also noted that the fact that
the federal government had not imposed conscription meant that, “Cette
population a montre une certaine confiance dans les paroles et dans les actes
de nos dirigeants d’Ottawa.”
As noted above regarding the
initial consensus around conscription, no community in Ottawa wanted to elevate
the question of conscription for overseas service to a point of dividing the
general community. The consensus was one
of a restrained approach to the issue of conscription, not over the issue
itself. In light of this, it is
suggested that Le Droit’s comments immediately above regarding the
desire of the people to Quebec to give the federal government the benefit of
the doubt, and regarding the general desire to not be confrontational to the
point of threatening national unity over conscription and the direction of the
war, may perfectly reflected the attitude of the Francophone population of
Ottawa at the time, as reflected in attitudes of their main newspaper. It also represented a softening of the
position of Le Droit, which appears impressed by the fact that war had
come, and conscription had not, in fact, been introduced.
If Le Droit had trouble
reading much from the Quebec election, The Ottawa Journal read enough
from it to actually pronounce its own conscription program for the first
time. The Journal believed, first
and foremost, that the election of the Liberal Party in that province, and the
defeat of Duplessis government, meant that the conscription issue was a
“bogeyman” in Quebec. It stated that,
“Wednesday’s election may well convince professional anti-conscriptionists that
their old game is up; that the anti-conscription cry is no longer good
psychology for Quebec.”
The Journal continued, and
revealed its own conscription policy, as follows,
Conscription, at this time, may be neither necessary nor
desirable. But what can be said, we
think, is that if the time would come when conscription would be deemed
necessary, we would not need to fear a disunited country. It might well be that just as
French-Canadians have volunteered in this war with an eagerness as great as
English-Canadians, so would they loyally accept their part under selective or
compulsory service.
The Journal therefore
believed in conscription, but only when events warranted its introduction. This position hardened over time.
.
Following on the Quebec election,
the federal election of March 1940 was another important watershed. This election – a massive Liberal victory -
guaranteed that the Liberals under Prime Minister King would manage the issue
of conscription for the rest of the war.
The election was called in late
January of 1940. The Citizen
responded to the election with a call for a government to be elected that would
be “…dedicated to the task of mobilizing the whole power of the nation for the
years of war ahead.” It continued in its
editorial by condemning party politics, accusing both the Liberals and
Conservatives of leaving the country unprepared for war, and of being
“…essentially conservative.” Finally, it
called for a government with ministers from both parties in order to get on
with the war. In short, the Citizen
continued to view the events of the day through the rubric of deep apprehension
concerning the political system of the day.
On February 15, 1940, the Citizen
called for maximum national mobilization, meaning the mobilization of the
economy to support the war effort, and “…a more comprehensive policy of
national service…” The paper followed
this up the next day by noting in its editorial the demands by the New
Democracy Leader, W. D. Herridge for national service, and his prediction that
this would become a reality before the year was out. The Citizen commented favourably on
this prediction, and continued berating the other two parties, and particularly
the Conservatives for supporting a Liberal policy in hopes of gaining seats in
Quebec. This anti-Conservative attitude
was followed up by editorials on February 19th, February 22nd,
March 14th, March 15th, March 20th, and
March 22nd all opposing the Conservatives or their policies,
variously questioning their fitness to govern, and noting their lost
opportunity in insisting on supporting the Liberal war policy of what the Citizen
saw as half-measures.
On March 27, 1940, the Citizen
interpreted the massive Liberal election victory as follows, “A national
democratic government has been elected to press on with every necessary measure
to mobilize the whole power of the nation for the years of war effort ahead.” Given that the Liberals had not run on such a
platform, and given the reality of the Liberal’s policy of slow, cautious
involvement and preparation, nothing could be further from the truth.
From the perspective of
conscription, the election of March 1940 was a stunning disappointment for the Citizen. As has been seen, The Ottawa Citizen
wanted full mobilization to fight what it saw as a total war against
totalitarian enemies. In spite of the Citizen’s
rhetoric, the reelection of King with a massive majority could not by any
stretch of the imagination be seen as a call for this level of action. Nonetheless, that conscription call, and
vindication for the Citizen, was only three months away.
While the Citizen bemoaned
the federal government’s lack of commitment to the war, Le Droit found
reason for cautious support. In its editorial of January 17, 1940, Le Droit
noted that, “Le participation du Canada au conflit Européen n’absorbe pas toute
l’attention du gouvernement fédérale.” It went on to laud efforts to
establish a national unemployment insurance scheme.
The federal election saw Le
Droit return to some of its previously enunciated positions, particularly
regarding the possibility of Canadian neutrality. In its editorial of March 19, 1940, Le
Droit reaffirmed its position that Canada, by way of the Statute of
Westminster, was free to choose to remain neutral should it so choose, noting
as follows, “Chaque Dominion a le droit et le devoir de décider de sa politique
étranger en fonction de ses propres intérêts.”
This was followed-up by an
editorial on March 21st commenting on a Saturday Night Magazine
article which blamed King for returning Canada to colony status by
automatically participating in Britain’s newest war. Regarding the article, and the possibility of
neutrality, Le Droit quoted the article and stated that, as regards a
Canadian participation in the war, “Il peut participer, s’il le veut; il peut
aussi s’abstenir.” Le Droit went
on to confirm its essential point, as made the previous September, which was
that Canada was within its rights to maintain neutrality in a war involving the
British Empire.
Regarding the election itself, Le
Droit noted that King had followed a policy of compromise between those who
demanded neutrality, and those who demanded total war. It also acknowledged that both King and
Manion had pursued what Le Droit called the “necessary policy” of not
conscripting for overseas service. Le
Droit also noted, however, that in spite of its official policy against
conscription, many Conservatives called for it anyway, and that the
Conservatives were far more imperialistic than the Liberals. Further, it noted that many provincial
Conservatives had committed, “…grave injustices contre les droits religieux et
nationaux des minorités.” Because of this, Le Droit threw its support behind
the Liberals under King, noting that, “Le premier ministre et ses collègues ont
réussi a maintenir l’unité nationale pendent les heures graves que nous
traversons.”
After the election, Le Droit commented on the Liberal victory as
follows, “Il est évident que le majorité de l’électorat est satisfaite du
gouvernement actuel, des homes politiques qui le dirigent et des sentiments qui
l’inspirent…” In essence, by
the time of the electoral victory of the Liberals in March of 1940, it appears
that Le Droit, while bemoaning the fact that Canada did not choose
neutrality the previous September, was impressed enough with the Liberal
government of King to give it a begrudging support. Where the Citizen saw in this election
a call for total war, Le Droit viewed it as a call to simply stay the
course. Clearly, Le Droit’s
appreciation was more accurate.
The Ottawa Journal, like the Citizen,
preferred that Canada make a maximum effort in the war. In calling for this, however, the words used
by the Journal belie its intent.
It said, for example, that, “The only thing of consequence today is
pulling our full weight in the war, which we entered by common consent, and the
choice ifs of men and policies best calculated to make our will
effective.” The concept of “pulling
one’s weight” pertains to cooperative efforts where others also pull their
weight. The implication, it is
suggested, is of “pulling weight” within the British Empire, as opposed to the Citizen’s
preference for making maximum effort in a war against totalitarian
regimes. The Journal’s focus was
the Empire; the Citizen’s was on the nature of Canada’s enemy, but both
ended up at the same place as regards the central issue in the campaign,
namely, the war effort.
In terms of preference, the Journal
strongly preferred the Conservatives, with its various editorials constituting
counter-arguments too much of the support received by the Liberals. In particular, the Journal saw in the
anti-conscription message of the Liberal Party a threat to national unity – in
essence, that the anti-conscription call, in that it was based on appeals to
fear and prejudice, was dangerous for national unity as it lead to a situation
in which the Liberals ruled with a majority in Quebec, but only minority
support from the rest of Canada. Noting
this, the Journal stated that, “The first public man to raise the
anti-conscriptionist cry in this election was Mr. King himself.” The implication as that King was purposely
dividing the country to remain in office.
In terms of policy, the Journal
came out in support of the Conservative call for national government, which the
Journal called a “…War Parliament in which not merely the Government,
but the Opposition as well, will give to Canada a more resolute and flaming war
leadership…” The Journal later
stated that,
What the Journal thinks it does know is this: That even
though Mr. King’s Government be returned on Tuesday, Mr. King’s Government will
not continue in office as a party government through this war. No party government could. The people of Canada, making common
sacrifices, wanting and striving for national unity, will never permit a single
party to go on through trial and terror in sole control of the war effort.
In essence, the preferences of
the Journal as regards a national government was close to the
preferences of the Citizen, but both were opposed to the preferences of Le
Droit, which was satisfied with the leadership of the Liberals, and which
would have been concerned about Conservatives in any national government. The Journal, however, supported the
Conservatives, while the Citizen gave support to the Liberals primarily
by questioning the readiness of the Conservatives to govern. As has been seen, both parties called for a
greater war effort, with the Citizen supporting conscription, while Le
Droit preferred the status quo.
In the event, the election
results were extremely disappointing for the Journal, and unlike the Citizen,
it had no qualms about hiding its disappointment. The Journal stated as follows
regarding the outcome, “The Journal…can only marvel at the extraordinary
support secured by Mr. King. Mice could
hardly petition against cats more solidly than electors have petitioned for the
Government.” The Journal also
noted that King had been given a mandate to use all that Canada possessed to
carry on the war, echoing slightly, the sentiments of the Citizen.
What may we say about this
crucial election and the opinions of the various Ottawa papers, and presumably
of their respective constituencies, from the perspective of conscription; in
short, why did this election matter?
The three papers in Ottawa all
took fairly robust positions regarding the election that had major implications
for their reactions to the introduction of conscription within Canada once the
nature of the war changed in the weeks that followed.
Le Droit had continued
to voice support for neutrality during the election, and actually came out in
support of the Liberals under King. This
position was only sustainable as long as relative peace continued in Europe. In the face of Germany’s invasion of the
small neutral countries such as Norway and in the Low Countries; in the face of
an obvious threat to Canada should Britain also fall, Le Droit’s
preference for Canadian neutrality looked entirely unreal – Le Droit
never voiced this preference again. As
well, given Le Droit’s recent support for the Liberals, its voice
was muted when conscription for service in Canada and a wider total war policy,
was introduced within three months of the March, 1940 election. Having supported the reelection of the
Liberals, Le Droit was in no position to oppose the policy change around
conscription when it came weeks later.
The Journal, with the
Conservatives having suffered a massive defeat in the election, was similarly
muted, as any opposition to Liberal government policy in May and June of 1940
flew in the face of the massive electoral support the Liberals had just
received. The Journal would
remain chastened for some time.
The Citizen, of the three
papers, was vindicated by events, as its preferred policy of national
mobilization came partly to fruition as a result. This brings the narrative to the great events
of May and June, 1940.
France and the Low Countries;
Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, fell to German arms in May and June of 1940,
with Britain being expelled from Continental Europe. The results of this calamity shook the
democratic world to its core.
From the start of these new
hostilities, The Ottawa Citizen continued to question the system of
party government in Ottawa, and to call for a policy of total war. On Monday, May 13, 1940 it took the
opportunity to complain about the quality of the Official Opposition, noting
that,
There is no reason to believe…that Conservative
leadership in the new parliament is to be any more vigorous for a total war
policy. During the election campaign the
Conservative party protested vehemently against being associated with a
national war policy of conscription in Canada.
In assessing the threat to
Canada, the Citizen further noted as follows, “The Germans would have
been in Canada long ago but for the greater readiness of nations on the
battlefront in Europe, particularly the United Kingdom and Franc, but also
Holland and Belgium…” While this may
have seemed like hyperbole in mid-May of 1940, when victory was still possible
and German forces were no where near Canada, the perception and reality of a
real threat would grow in the coming weeks.
On May 14, 1940, the Citizen
continued to question the political direction of the country stating that,
“There is no sign of awareness in Canadian high places…on the urgent need for
action to mobilize the whole power of the nation in time to bring an effective
Canadian contribution before the battle for life has been decided.” As has been emphasized, the Citizen
took the view that war with totalitarian Germany demanded similar levels of
preparation on the part of Canada.
Canada’s comparative lack of preparation was emphasized by the Citizen
in editorials throughout May and June 1940.
The Citizen’s assessment
of Canada’s interests in the conflict became more focused with time. On May 16, 1940, it noted that,
One first demand of an undefeated Nazi Germany after this
war would be freer access for German enterprise in Canada and South American
republics. The Nazi terms would almost
certainly include unrestricted entrance of German migrants, with access to
Canadian natural resources. The United
States would think twice before declaring war on the dictatorship states of the
world to save Canada from becoming an outlet of German enterprise.
On May 22, 1940, the Citizen renewed
its calls for a war cabinet of five ministers responsible to Parliament for the
direction of the war, without being responsible for the day-to-day
administration of particular departments, as in Great Britain. As noted previously, this differed from the
Conservative call for a union government which would put these ministers in
charge of various departments, and deflect from their task of guiding the war
effort.
On June 18, 1940 the Citizen
declared that, “Total war is drawing near to Canada. Canada’s part in the war can no longer be
carried on as a form of private enterprise inspired by the incentive of
gain….it is quite possible that Canada may become another Norwegian
battlefront.” It went on to blame a
“private money monopoly” for incapacitating Parliament, and leaving Canada
unprepared for war. One can sense the
despair in the editorials of this most difficult day.
And yet, the events of June 18,
1940 were a vindication for the Citizen as the government announced its
intention to fully mobilize for war. The
editorial for June 19, 1940 reflected this sense of vindication and relief in
stating that,
There should be national acclaim of the government’s
decision to mobilize the human and material resources of Canada for total
war. Even though there has been no
nation-wide leadership of opinion in Canadian newspapers for compulsory
military service, public opinion has expressed itself in recent weeks through
national organizations like the Canadian legion and the Canadian Corps
Association. Events have made it the
imperative duty of the government to give leadership.
This day also saw the Citizen
comment on the preparedness of Quebec to accept conscription by quoting a
pro-conscription editorial in Le Canada, a Montreal daily, and noting
that,
There should never have been any doubt about the
readiness of French Canada to respond to the call of national defence. It is significant that one of the leading
daily newspapers in Quebec, printed in the French language, should be ahead of
many Canadian newspapers printed in English in this declaration for Canadian
mobilization of manpower.
The Citizen made further
comment on the issue of conscription on June 22, 1940 when it noted that,
“Conscription has been so misrepresented to the Canadian public, it has been
made to appear to be almost degrading when it is really the way of democracy as
well as of military efficiency.” Given
the political importance of the issue of conscription in Quebec, and the recent
history of the issue, it is hard to conclude other than that this last comment
was directed at French Canadian opponents of compulsory service.
For the Citizen, the
events of May and June 1940 served to partially put into practice its preferred
policy of total war, including compulsory military service. What was missing was the idea of compulsory
service overseas, which it would continue to advocate for until it finally came
to fruition in 1944.
Le Droit, as has been
seen, preferred that Canada remain neutral during the war. Its first editorial commentary following
the German attack related to the violation of the neutrality of Holland,
Belgium and Luxembourg. Its comments were as follows,
Hitler s’est enfin décide a porter
un grand coup. Tandis que l’aviation
allemande bombardait plusieurs endroits en France et en Angleterre, les hordes
germaniques, violant la neutralité de la Hollande, de la Belgique, et du
Luxembourg, ont envahi ces trois petits pays…Le nouvelle crée ici une sensation
profond.
Each paper in Ottawa during this
difficult time saw events from the perspective of their own underlying
bias. The English press generally looked
to the widening war, and demanded a greater war effort. Le Droit, rather than considering how
to fight the war, watched as its position regarding neutrality became less and
less tenable. As has been seen, Le
Droit maintained this position as late as the federal election only 10
weeks before. Its first editorial
comment following the German attack on neutral countries described the effect
on opinion within the French community as “profound”; indeed.
Le Droit continued in this vein with an
editorial on May 14, 1940 outlining Hitler’s duplicity, as follows, “Politique
de duplicité: Hitler calme d’abord par de belles paroles les inquiétudes des
pays dont il a décrète la perte, puis quelques mois après, par une attaque
soudaine, il les réduit en servitude. ”
This commentary continued on May 21, 1940 with editorial cataloguing
German atrocities in the neutral countries.
Le Droit, having
supported Canadian neutrality, was essentially without a defensible policy
position regarding Canada’s position in the war by mid-May 1940, given that it
had become obvious that Germany would never respect the neutrality of any
country. Of its policy regarding the
war, there remained only its opposition to conscription, which through the end
of May and into June dominated Le Droit’s commentary.
On May 22, 1940 Le Droit
commented on the fact that war policy had started to dominate the parliamentary
session. It ended its editorial as follows, “Si les succès d’Hitler as continuent en
Europe, cette idée (a national government) tendra a faire son chemin dans les
milieux anglo-canadiens. Qui vivra verra
si, sur ce point, la dernière guerre se répétera.” This last allusion was clearly to a repetition of the
conscription crisis of 1917.
The editorial for May 29 extended
from the Le Droit’s May 22 editorial, and noted that King had consulted
the opposition, and openly questioned whether this consultation was a harbinger
of a union government. The editorial of
the next day outlined how the Prime Minister was under tremendous pressure in
Parliament, noting that, “Les adversaires de M. King prétendent que l’effort de
guerre du Canada n’est pas suffisant.” Regarding the hoped-for outcome of the individuals
applying this pressure, Le Droit noted that, “Ils espèrent que le jour
viendra ou la conscription sera de nouveau impose…”
The Le Droit editorial for
June 19, 1940 concerned the announcement of conscription for service in Canada
the day before. It noted the facts
regarding the government’s new policy of total war, and commented as follows
regarding this change, and the moderate approach that had been approved by the
people of Canada in the recent election, as follows,
Dix mois après l’entrée du Canada
dans le présent conflit européen, le gouvernement fédéral se départ donc
presque totalement de sa politique de guerre ‘modérée, libre et volontaire’,
qu’il avait fait adopter par le people aux récentes élections générales de mars
1940.
Of course, Le Droit had
supported the government in the recent election based on this same moderate
approach.
The June 19, 1940 editorial
continued, and noted that the policy of conscription for service in Canada,
with volunteers only for overseas service was consistent with King’s previous
promise to not conscript for overseas service.
It further stated as follows,
Toujours, nous avons proclame que le
Canadien français serait le premier a se lever pour la défense de son
territoire lorsque celui-ce serait menace chez lui. On a vu tant de choses qui ne devaient pas se
réaliser, arriver depuis quelques semaines que personne ne doit hésiter a
prendre le moyens de faire face a toute éventualité. Le service militaire obligatoire pour service
militaire au pays est une mesure que le gouvernement juge indispensable dans
les circonstances actuelles.
As well,
Le Canadien français n’a qu’une
patrie, une unique patrie, le Canada.
Dans les moments périlleux de son existence comme ses ancêtres,
il ; sera la premier a voler a sa défense en territoire canadien et il
sera le dernier a cesser le feu pour la défense de son territoire, d’Halifax a
Vancouver, contre tout envahisseur.
In short, by the end of this
period of crisis, Le Droit accepted the need to introduce conscription
for service in Canada, in the circumstances, and based both on an appreciation
that this was consistent with the government’s original promise, and based on
the government’s appreciation of the situation. Given the gravity of the
events, including the explosion of the myth of possible neutrality, and given
that Le Droit had supported the reelection of the Liberal government of
King only three months earlier, it is suggested that maintaining a position
contrary to conscription for service only within Canada would have been
difficult in the extreme.
The Ottawa Journal responded to
the crisis of May – June 1940 with its full support of Britain, but with a
somewhat tempered approach to Canada’s Liberal government. The effects of the recent election loss on
the Journal are obvious in its various comments. For example, on May 21, 1940 it stated as
follows as regards an expended national effort,
It is useless to hark back to the argument of the general
election…but we appeal to the patriotism of the private Liberal members of
parliament to spur into utmost vigorous effort the present administration of
Canada in prosecution of our hitherto pitiful showing in the desperate struggle
which is going on in the world between the forces of decency, of free
civilization and of Christianity, and the forces of brutality, murder and
atheism.
This gentle, even censured
approach to the Liberal government continued throughout this period of
time.
On May 29, 1940 the Journal
asked if the country was finally waking up to the threat in an editorial called
Is Canada Waking Up? In this
editorial, the Journal noted that the government of King had stepped-up
recruiting for the Air Force and Army, and commented that, “This, however, is
no time for recriminations; Canadians can only hope that the Government has
really awakened, is preparing to give resolute, active deeds instead of words
and plans on paper.” This plea to avoid
recriminations may be compared to the election rhetoric of the Journal
which included vigorous condemnations of King, especially surrounding the
circumstances of election call itself, where the Journal stated that,
“…Parliament was destroyed at a day’s notice by the Mackenzie King
Government…Could any totalitarian government, any dictator, any Hitler or
Stalin, have shown greater contempt for representative institutions?” Following the election defeat, comparisons of
King to Hitler and Stalin within the Journal disappeared.
Even within this subdued approach
to the government the Journal, much like the Citizen, did keep up
some pressure for a greater effort on the part of Canada. On June 17, 1940 it noted that,
Prime Minister King says the Government is ‘still
considering’ national registration. He
adds that its adoption will depend upon whether , in the Government’s judgment,
it is a national war need….Many must think that if there is one national war
need vital at this time, it is national registration.
In response to the introduction
of conscription for service at home, and general mobilization of economic
resources on June 18, 1940, the Journal noted that the German army could
not come to Canada without inviting war against the United States. It then added that, “If we are honestly for
the war to the best of our ability, it is not conscription limited to ‘home
defence’ that is needed, but conscription unlimited, both of men and
means.”
Regarding the actual threat to
Canada, the Journal further noted that,
In Canada, our skins are not in danger no matter what the
event of the war – so long as we stay in Canada…Our pockets would be badly hit;
the Germans would destroy our ships and our trans-oceanic trade. Also, he who pays the piper calls the tune;
and if the United States had to protect our territory, this country would
inevitably have to accept the status of a mere appendage of the United States;
annexation would surely follow soon or late…Let us realize, then, that in this
war we are fighting for our national existence.
The Journal ended this
editorial with a further call for maximum effort, again noting that this is not
the time for recriminations, although, “…our war effort so far has been
comparatively pitiful.” Of course, that
very effort had been overwhelmingly supported by the Canadian population just
12 weeks before in the general election.
The editorial of June 20, 1940,
which followed the announcement of conscription for home service, represented a
“return to form” of sorts for the Journal. If the events of the day were a vindication
for the Citizen, they were perhaps more of a release for the Journal;
a release, that is, from having so obviously been on the wrong side of the
general population the previous March.
The editorial of June 20th stated as follows,
That it is more than ever up to this country now to spur
itself to every possible effort to help in the British war cause is undoubtedly
the feeling of a vast majority of the Canadian people; and the Dominion
Government can make no mistake, to the minds of most of us, in going all
possible length in that direction….while ‘home defence’ is all very well as far
as it goes, let us all realize that the battle of Canada as well as of the
whole British Empire must be fought in and from Great Britain.
And so, by the end of this
difficult period the Journal again felt comfortable speaking for “…a
vast majority of the Canadian people…” after that same vast majority proved the
Journal so wrong just weeks before.
Like the Citizen, the Journal could support the
government’s mobilization in June, 1940 even if it thought that mobilization
late in coming.
By the end of June 1940, the
three main Ottawa newspapers still reflected a consensus regarding the issue of
conscription, in that they all supported the government’s policy of
conscription for home defence. The events
that drove this consensus were the German military successes in Europe which
had made conscription a reality, to the vindication of the Citizen, the
relief of the Journal, and to the grudging acceptance of Le Droit.
This consensus, apparent in June
1940, would not last. The rest of the
war would see opinions in these the three newspapers diverge, up to the final
invocation of conscription for overseas service in November, 1944. Prior to that, Canada and Ottawa witnessed
the road to the extremely divisive National Plebiscite of April 1942, which
started with the attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941.
Consensus Lost – The Plebiscite of 1942
The road to the Plebiscite was a
long one. From pressure building for
conscription for overseas service toward the end of 1941, through to the
amendment of the National Resources Mobilization Act in July, 1942, the
entire journey took over six months.
What follows will be divided into three parts covering the period up to
and including the attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, and into January
of 1942; the period from the call of a plebiscite in January of 1942, to the
plebiscite itself in April of 1942; ending with the post-plebiscite period in
which the Liberal Government refused to introduce immediate conscription for
overseas service considering that such a move was not “necessary”.
The Ottawa Citizen started
December of 1941 with a strong call for national compulsory military service
overseas, stating its rationale for this as follows,
Compulsory military service is the accepted policy of
both substantial parties in parliament.
Under the limited Liberal policy, however, conscription is applied only
for military service within Canada – where there is no likelihood of being
called upon to fight against an enemy invasion until the Canadian forces
overseas have gone down in a general defeat…when it would be too late to resist
on this side of the ocean.
The Citizen ended this
commentary noting that, “Under Canada’s policy of muddling through, the present
Canadian army corps would be liable to be cut to pieces for lack of trained
reserves.”
In direct response to the news
from Pearl Harbor, and a new perceived threat to Canada’s west coast, the Citizen
noted that, “The time is surely at hand to rally the whole power of this nation
– men for the fighting forces, workers for the war industries – to serve
wherever they are needed most.” This was
followed-up three days later with a further editorial stating that,
Whatever the reason for the government’s delay in putting
the National Mobilization Act into more effective motion, the signals are that
this country is aroused. The limitations
of party politics in the government at Ottawa have to go….When Mr. Hanson, the
Conservative party leader, spoke last Tuesday of the need to apply the
selective draft to Canadian manpower he reflected united Canadian opinion.
As always, the Citizen
noted the defective party system as a core issue to be addressed. It specifically signaled out King on this
point and noted that, “…it has been Prime Minister King’s general practice in
politics to do nothing until he is impelled to take action by the pressure of
public opinion or political circumstances.”
This may fairly summarize King’s approach to the issue of conscription
throughout the war.
The Citizen provided
substantial commentary on a mid-December Gallup Poll in its December 26th
editorial. That Gallup Poll stated that
67% of Canadians, and 75% outside of Quebec, expected national selective
service for service overseas. In Quebec,
41% expected this eventuality. Further,
the Gallup Poll reported that 60% of Canadians would vote for national service
outside of Canada if asked. In light of
this, the Citizen noted that a substantial percentage of Canadians
favour conscription for overseas service.
The Citizen editorial of
December 29, 1941 continued its commentary regarding the opinion poll. It noted that while 73% of people outside of
Quebec favoured it, less than one-third of Quebecois favoured conscription for
overseas service. It then went on to
state, as regards Quebec, that,
As for Quebec, a word from responsible leaders would
remove from there the possibility of any repetition of the scenes enacted in
1917 and 1918. French-Canadians have a
different feeling about the nature of this war.
They know we sink or swim together.
The Citizen then provided
an analysis or explanation of the Quebec position in its editorial of the next
day, as follows,
There is less demand in Quebec then in other provinces
for conscription to apply to military service overseas…it is well to remember
that the Canadian people everywhere have only come gradually to demand a
national policy of conscription…It would be well to bear the gradualness of
Canada’s awakening in mind when Quebec’s position is being considered.
These attempts to take into
account the position of French Canada would continue, and constitute a major
movement away from the consensus apparent up to June of 1940. From initial attempts to understand the
position of French Canada as regards conscription, this type of commentary
would, as will be seen, progress over time toward divisive accusation and
outright insults.
On January 8, 1942, the Citizen
commented on the possibility of a call for a plebiscite regarding the
government promise to not conscript for overseas service. It took a caustic approach to the issue, and
noted as follows,
This referendum device would be an incredible departure
from the principle of responsible government as it has been practiced in
Canada. Especially at this time when
leadership is more than ever needed, the government would be giving no
direction to the nation’s war effort.
This general distaste on the part
of the Citizen for the politics of King would also deepen as the war
progressed.
Like the Citizen, well
before Pearl Harbor Le Droit saw new calls for conscription for overseas
service, even noting the method by which this could come about. On November 13, 1941 Le Droit ran an
editorial stating as follows,
Pour ce qui est de la conscription
pour le service militaire outré-mer, le gouvernement décidera-t-il de consulter
le people, au cours de la prochaine session, pour se libérer de l’engagement
qu’il a pris contre cette mesure, aux élections générales de 1940?...ce point
demeure le secret de M. King.
On November 22, 1941 Le Droit responded to growing calls for
conscription for overseas service by questioning the basis for such calls, and
noting that conscription already existed, stating that, “L’application du
principe de cette mesure, il est vrai, est restreinte à la défense territoriale
du Canada en Canada. Mais cela, en
outre, ne change rien à la réalité. La
conscription existe au pays.”
On December 3, 1941 Le Droit,
like the Citizen, noted a public opinion poll in its editorial of the
day. Unlike the Citizen, it chose
an earlier poll that had asked respondents what were the major problems of the
day. In response to a poll about
national priorities, only 35% noted the need for conscription for overseas
service, while 65% (77% in Quebec) of respondents looked to other issues. The implication, as noted by Le Droit
was that, it was not true that conscription was of overwhelming importance to
Canadians.
Calls for conscription for
overseas service intensified following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Le Droit responded on December 11,
1941 by noting that, with a new possible threat to Canada there need be no
change in the government’s policy concerning conscription for overseas service,
as conscription already applied in Canada.
It ended with a warning about the need to safe-guard national unity, as
follows,
…il est évident qu’elle doit être faite dans la masure de nos moyens et tout
en sauve-guardant la paix intérieure et l’unité nationale. Prétendre que l’on ne saurait y atteindre
sans la conscription pour service outre-mer et sans la formation d’un
gouvernement d’union, c’est vouloir pêcher en eau trouble.
This essential warning about the
fragility of Canadian unity in the face of calls for conscription and national
government was repeated by Le Droit on December 16, 1941. Given this concern for national unity, the
consensus around the issue of conscription, apparent as it may have been in
June 1940, was disappearing by the end of 1941.
Le Droit started 1942
with a prediction of tougher times ahead.
It predicted the full mobilization of manpower for military and economic
purposes via national selective service, and increased financial strains on the
population (Note: the NRMA had not resulted in full economic mobilization,
which remained to be implemented at the end of 1941.) It also noted that the Conservatives would
continue their demands for conscription for overseas service, even if King
continued to oppose it.
The Ottawa Journal saw the issue
of conscription and of national selective service in order to make a maximum
effort, through British eyes. Its
editorial of December 3, 1941 noted the efforts that Britain had been making
through a system of total mobilization, and asked, “…if the British need for
manpower is so grave that men of up to 50 and women between 20 and 30 are being
called to service, are we playing the part of a loyal ally by leaving war
service over here to the whim of the individual?” It further noted that,
“…when the people of this country awaken to this war’s danger and demand
selective national service, selective national service will come.”
In light of the attack on Pearl
Harbor, the Journal took the opportunity to repeat its calls for greater
effort, noting that, “This country, with every other country under the
democratic banner, must shake itself from indifference and over-confidence,
prepare itself for every sacrifice that its resources and courage can
yield.” What is telling is that, unlike Le
Droit or even the Citizen, the Journal saw the Japanese
attack as one upon all the democratic nations of the world. Its vision represented a political
perspective that was, by far, the most international of the three papers in
Ottawa.
The Journal continued and
repeated its call for a national government in a second editorial of December
11, 1941. Interestingly enough, in light
of the Citizen’s often stated distaste for party government; the Journal
stated that, “It is not a question of whether the present party Government is
good or bad, efficient or inefficient.
In the Journal’s judgment the present government has done, in most
respects, a magnificent job…” The Journal
continued and stated that the reason to favour national government was to
stop the political infighting inherent in party government, and by so doing to
improve national morale.
What is telling from the above
editorials was the fact that the Journal gave due credit to the
government for its efforts to date, while also calling for a national
government. This change of heart on the
part of the Journal, as regards the government, was further evident in
its editorial of January 5, 1942 in which the Journal noted what it
called “hysterical” demands for conscription for overseas service by some
papers in Ontario, including what the Journal called the “usually sane”
the Globe and Mail. While
continuing to support conscription for overseas service, the Journal
clearly attempted to distinguish itself from some of its more strident English
Canadian counterparts in early January of 1942.
It is suggested here that this strongly implies that the constituency
that the Journal spoke for in Ottawa at the time, namely the Anglo
Canadian perspective, was perhaps more cognizant of opposing points of view
than were many other similar communities in Ontario, many of which would lack
an alternative perspective within their cities.
The result was a more tempered approach to the issue of conscription
than in other English communities.
Prior to the call for a
referendum on conscription for overseas service, the three major papers in
Ottawa had started to diverge in terms of their consensus around the issue of
conscription. For the Citizen and
the Journal, conscription for service in Canada had never been
sufficient. Now, they were prepared to
push much harder to bring their preferred policy to fruition, in the face of
opposition from Le Droit which saw conscription for overseas service as
unnecessary, and a threat to national unity.
Following the call for a
plebiscite in January, 1942, each of the papers in Ottawa conducted what was
essentially a propaganda campaign in favour of their respective positions
regarding conscription up to the actual plebiscite on April 27, 1942. In this regard, it is fair to say that almost
no day went by during this time in which one paper or another pronounced on
some aspect of the debate. What follows
is an attempt to discuss only the major points made by each paper, as to review
every element of each newspaper’s entire argument is beyond the scope of this
work, and would involve aspects of the argument that are subsidiary to the
outcome.
The Ottawa Citizen touched on
the issue of conscription only lightly in the few weeks after the rumored call
for a plebiscite in early January of 1942.
On January 12, 1942 for example, it made passing reference to the need
for conscription by noting that, “A Canadian army corps is at the spearhead on
the British side of the North Sea. It is
vital that Canada should be ready with reinforcements to back up the Canadian
fighting forces at the zero hour.” Given
the fact that the fighting forces were overseas, this could have but one
meaning.
On January 23, 1942 the Citizen
commented directly on the Speech from the Throne of the day before which called
for a plebiscite to relieve the government of its promise to not conscript for
overseas service. Much like its previous
comments two weeks before, the Citizen noted that, “…there is nothing in
yesterday’s speech from the throne to assure the people of Canada that a more
honest policy of selective service is to be put into operation by this
government. The plebiscite is rather
negation of responsible government in Canada.”
As well, “There is no leadership in plebiscite. The government is rather, in effect, asking
to be released from the obligation to give leadership.”
The Citizen then went on
the comment favourably on the campaign by the Conservative Leader, Arthur
Meighen, for a seat in the House of Commons.
Specifically, the Citizen commented favourably on a speech by
Meighen in which he noted that the only reason the government would call for a
plebiscite to be released from its promise is if it thought Canada needed to
organize for all-out war, in which case the government had an obligation to
organize the country thus.
Meighen, of course, lost the
by-election. In reflecting on this loss,
the Citizen noted that, “The government can be expected to take
yesterday’s by-election results as votes of confidence.” The Citizen then lauded Arthur
Meighen, but conceded that the Liberal government, which it considered as
conservative as the Conservatives themselves, actually had won a resounding
vote of confidence.
Even though it was somewhat
chastened by Arthur Meighen’s loss, and more so by the obvious support it
indicated for the government’s wartime policies, the Citizen continued
to question the methods of the older political parties throughout this
pre-Plebiscite period. Unlike the Journal
following the defeat of the Conservatives in the March 1940 election, the Citizen
did not let its voice be tempered by political reality distasteful to it. In an editorial on March 10, 1942 for
example, it noted that,
“…a revolution has struck in which the old political
practices and appeals simply do not make sense.
Out of the current upheaval will come demands for actions alongside
which the passage of such hoary reforms as ‘unemployment insurance’ will seem
pathetic.”
As noted above, the conversation
that occurred between English and French papers in Ottawa, as occasionally
reflected in the editorials of the day prior to the plebiscite period, grew in
importance by mid-March, 1942. On March
18, 1942, the Citizen ran two editorials dealing with Quebec. The first was entitled Young Quebec’s
Confusion, in which the Citizen noted that, “Many of the
younger people especially are so confused, they seem unable to realize that
this land is in dire peril.” Further
that,
Loyalty to Canada alone should have made it plain to the
people in common, in every province, that attack on the enemy abroad is the
most effective way to defend home territory.
Quebec’s isolationist element has become so confused, however, active
service overseas is still regarded as defence of England.
The linking of the Citizen’s
vision of common sense to the idea of “loyalty to Canada” in this editorial was
an indicator of the subtle and increasing vehemence of the argument between
those in Ottawa who supported, and those who opposed conscription for overseas
service.
The second editorial was called Quebec
Is Answering ‘No’. In it, the Citizen
noted that opposition to conscription for overseas service was actually
increasing in Quebec. The Citizen
further noted that the government had made no actual pledge to introduce
conscription even in the event of a ‘yes’ vote, but that such a vote would at
least release the government from its pledge.
In this, the Citizen was essentially indicating that it
considered that Quebec’s expected ‘no” vote would not be binding on the government
as regards the pledge. In short, for the
Citizen the minority’s opposition was not binding if the majority had
passed judgment, which is the precise scenario that Le Droit feared
most.
The Citizen became even
more strident and nationalistic as the plebiscite approached. On March 27, 1942 its editorial of the day
spoke of the plebiscite giving the government a national vote of confidence, in
which, “Loyal Canada has no desire to impede the government in any necessary
measure to maintain the nation up to strength in the united front line.” It further added that “Undivided allegiance
to the government should be manifesting itself strongly at present.” Again, it is suggested that this call for
loyalty and allegiance had obvious negative implications for those who would
not heed it, namely, those in French Canada opposed to conscription. While not actually named, it should be
obvious to who this editorial was directed.
On April 18, 1942 the Citizen
touched on the important issue of the possible result of a ‘no’ vote. In the opinion of the Citizen, this
would imply a new government. As they
held that the government’s commitment was actually a personal commitment of
only King, and once the Prime Minister had stepped aside, the commitment would
go with him. It further questioned the
assertion that the government could just carry on in the event that the vote
was negative. More than that, the Citizen
called for the Prime Minister to resign in the event that every province,
including Quebec, did not vote in the affirmative. The rationale was based in the Citizen’s
assessment of national unity, in which it stated as follows,
The signs are that the plebiscite is dividing this
country along lines of national origin.
Quebec is liable to vote ‘No’, while the other provinces vote
‘Yes’. In this event the Mackenzie King
government would stand guilty of having divided the nation into antagonistic
camps….the plebiscite would have set the seal on divided allegiance.
Given that unity was the reason
why King claimed that he had called the plebiscite, this editorial amounted to
a vote of non-confidence in the government.
On April 21, 1942 the Citizen
analyzed the case against conscription for overseas service, noting that the
argument seemed to change to match circumstances, and concluded that, “The
isolationist dreamers are only concerned to argue that they can better serve
their country by staying here than going to other lands.” From lacking common sense, opponents of
conscription had now had become “dreamers” and “isolationists” in the opinion
of the Citizen.
The Citizen followed this
up with an appeal for an emphatic ‘yes’ vote in its editorial of April 24,
1942. Finally, on the day of the vote,
the Citizen chided the Prime Minister for remarks to the effect that
conscription may not be ‘necessary’ after all, and that this was not a vote for
conscription, but only to release the government from its pledge.
In the event, Quebec
overwhelmingly voted ‘no’, and the rest of Canada voted ‘yes’. The riding of
Ottawa West voted 92% in the affirmative, while 68% of residents in Ottawa East
did the same. Across the Ottawa River,
72% of the residents of the federal riding of Hull voted in the negative. The Citizen later claimed that as
two-thirds of the voters in Ottawa East were French Canadian, a slight French
Canadian majority for the affirmative had been achieved in this riding.
The Citizen responded to
the results of the plebiscite with an editorial on April 28, 1942 that returned
to one of its original concerns regarding conscription, which was the need to
apply national service fairly across social classes, stating that compulsory
service must be as compulsory as income taxes.
Again, this is entirely in keeping with its view of the politics of the
day.
On April 29, 1942 the Citizen
responded more directly, interpreting the result of the plebiscite as simply a
vote to get on with the war, constructing a cabinet without reference to
political party to manage the war effort going forward. The Citizen continued to see party
government as a major drag on the war effort stating that, “Party rule is
negative.”
Finally, the Citizen laid
blame for the negative vote in Quebec squarely at the feet of the Liberals in
Ottawa. In an editorial on April 30,
1942 the Citizen noted that the Liberals themselves had encouraged fiery
partisanship against conscription by the stand they took at the start of the
war against the policy. In short,
“Political negation at Ottawa is largely responsible for Quebec’s ‘No’ in last
Monday’s plebiscite.” It ended its
commentary by noting, again, the need to be rid of party government during the
war.
In the end, the Citizen
continued to view the plebiscite, and its related politics, from the rubric of
its opposition to party politics which it considered to be a negative influence
on the country. It also engaged in some
unfortunate commentary concerning the opponents of conscription, with a number
of editorials essentially questioning their loyalty to Canada, their
intelligence, and the legitimacy of their opposition. This attitude of intolerance, more than
anything, underscored the extreme divisiveness of the debate in the Ottawa
newspapers by this time.
Le Droit responded to
the announcement of a plebiscite by noting that the voluntary system had
attracted 500,000 men into the services, of whom 150,000 were overseas, with
authority to raise up to six divisions. It noted that, with this many men already in service,
conscription for overseas service would actually change very little, stating
that, “Alors, pourquoi opérer un chambardement qui, en réalité, changerait peu
l’état de choses actuel, mais qui ouvrirait la porte à toutes sortes d’abus et
menacerait de rompre l’unité nationale ?”
On February 16, 1942 Le Droit
reported on the progress of the debate around the government’s Throne Speech,
which included the call for a plebiscite to release the government from its
pledge to not conscript for overseas service.
Le Droit noted that only two French Canadian MPs had actually
spoken in favour of conscription for overseas service during the Throne Speech
debate, while every other French Canadian MP had spoken against, based on the
reasonable supposition that agreement to release the government from its
promise would lead to conscription for overseas service.
The February 16, 1942 Le Droit
editorial is instructive as it revealed much about the rationale in opposing
conscription for overseas service. It
was clear that the French Canadian MPs who opposed conscription did so as they
assumed that the plebiscite was about conscription for overseas service, which
was something they opposed largely as a matter of principle. The Citizen, in calling these people
“isolationist dreamers” could not understand the basic point which was that
most French Canadians simply did not agree with this method of recruitment – a
method which the Citizen considered common sense and preferred.
This inability to successfully
bridge the basic question of conscription as a method of recruitment and
organization, with all that meant from the perspective of historic grievances
on the one hand, versus concerns for efficiency and a type of equality of
sacrifice between classes that the Citizen espoused on the other,
constituted much of the essential debate between these communities. In short, the English Canadian nationalists
did not take the French Canadians complaints and concerns at face value, and the
French Canadians tended to see any new demands for conscription only from the
perspective of the past. As shall be
seen below, this essential difference of opinion was never successfully
bridged.
On February 27, 1942, Le Droit
addressed what it thought was the underlying rationale for the plebiscite. In short, it came down to British
imperialism, and the desire on the part of English Canada to support the same. Le Droit noted that,
Notre pays est une nation adulte,
mais il ne possède point la mentalité d’une nation adulte. Notre mentalité demeure, malgré le statut de
Westminster, celle d’une nation coloniale.
Voila qui, de la part de ceux qui considèrent que leur premier devoir de
loyalisme n’est pas envers l’Empire britannique, mais envers le Canada et
son roi, exige de ne pas libérer le gouvernement de ses engagements
anticonscriptionistes, de limiter, surtout en temps de guerre, la complète
liberté d’action du gouvernement quant au service militaire pour outre-mer.
If The Citizen saw
opponents of conscription as disloyal and unintelligent, Le Droit, for
its part, asserted that those who favoured it were childlike and colonial in
their attitudes, preferring the British Empire to becoming an “adult”
nation-state.
On February 28, 1942 Le Droit
noted that no one seriously opposed sending Canadian soldiers to oppose, not
just an attack on Canada, but even the threat of a direct attack on Canada,
even if that meant sending soldier outside of Canada itself. It stated that, “Au cas d’une
attaque directe ou d’une menace d’attaque, personne n’aurait d’objection
sérieuse à l’envoi de troupes canadiennes sur les territoires avoisinant le
Canada.” In essence, Le Droit had
moved somewhat in terms of its opposition to conscription for overseas service,
and acknowledged that, should “overseas” mean a territory close to Canada from
which an attach was imminent against Canada itself, it would consent to send
conscripts “overseas” to defend the country.
On March 7, 1942, Le Droit
took the position that the pledge that King had made in promising to not
introduce conscription for overseas service was a moral commitment to each and
every elector, cemented by way of his election based on that same promise in
March of 1940. Specifically, it said that,
Cet engagement moral, en effet,
n’est pas seulement un engagement collectif envers la nation, mais un
engagement pris personnellement envers chaque électeur qui a vote pour M. King
aux dernières élections générales de 1940, précisément a cause de la promesse
anticonscriptioniste du premier ministre.
It continued and noted that the
majority could not relieve the government of its promise by way of a plebiscite
as the promise was not collective, but individual and personal. Le Droit strongly hinted that it
considered that the only way that the government could be relieved from this
promise was by way of another general election.
In that respect, its opinion was similar to that of The Citizen,
which considered that the plebiscite was a betrayal of the traditions of
responsible government.
As a measure of the increasing
animosity between the communities in Ottawa, on March 19, 1942 Le Droit
noted an article in Saturday Night Magazine which alleged that many in
English Canada believed that French Canada opposed conscription in order to
avoid casualties in order to increase their numerical strength in Canada
following the war. In response, Le
Droit noted that no one had the right to make such accusations at Quebec,
which was doing its part in the war effort.
This unfortunate discussion
continued on March 24, 1942 when Le Droit responded to another article
in Saturday Night Magazine which noted that, should the French Canadian
Members of Parliament and Ministers advocate in favour of conscription in
Quebec, the vote would go in the affirmative in Quebec. This position is similar to the one espoused
by The Citizen on December 29, 1941, as noted above.
In response, Le Droit
noted that this was an extremely simplistic vision of French Canada. Further, it noted that Quebec was not against
the war effort, and had contributed much to the same. Regarding conscription for overseas service, Le
Droit noted that French Canada had decided that this was, “…ni sage, ni
necessaire…” It concluded by noting that
while Quebecois were born in Canada, many of those favouring conscription were
actually from the British Isles. The
tendency of Le Droit to see the demand for conscription for overseas
service as merely a reflection of a colonial attitude in support of a British
Empire war was again confirmed.
On April 13, 1942 Le Droit
noted that the entire enterprise of the plebiscite was vague. It was not exactly a plebiscite for
conscription, but merely to permit the government to be released from its
promise. Le Droit concluded that,
“Voila toute la vérité. L’objecte général de cette consultation populaire est la
conscription pour le service militaire outré-mer. Le vote n’en est pas un
direct mesure, mais c’en est un indirect.”
In short, just as Le Droit
had indicated prior to the war that it doubted any promises to not conscript
for overseas service, it now expressed the opinion that the plebiscite was not
actually about relieving the government of a promise, but about conscription
for overseas service itself.
On April 16, 1942 Le Droit
indicated its intention to support a “no” vote in the plebiscite. Its central point regarding conscription for
overseas service was simple – “Cette necessité n’est pas proveé.” This line of argument was continued it its
editorial of April 18, 1942 where the point was made that no one was saying
that aid should not be furnished to the Allied cause.
On April 20, 1942 Le Droit
noted that the issue of conscription had seriously divided the country, as in
1917. Specifically, it said that, “Comme en 1917, la question de la conscription
pour service outré-mer menace de diviser en deux camps le population du
pays.” The editorial ended by noting
that what was at stake was the liberty and existence of Canada itself. Finally, two days before the actual vote, Le
Droit repeated its assertion that the plebiscite was actually a product of
British imperialism, and its adherents and supporters in Canada.
The day after the vote Le
Droit issued a warning about the months to come, as follows,
La situation politique canadienne
est grosse de développements au cours des prochains mois. Elle va acculer au pied du mur les libéraux
ministériels du Québec. Quoi qu’il arrive,
nous voulons croire que la population canadienne garder son bon sens. Il faut plus que jamais songer a la nécessite
de l’unité nationale après ce conflit.
Les actes que l’on poser, d’ici douze mois, auront sur elle une
répercussion profonde.
If the editorials of Le Droit
are any indication, the pre-plebiscite period was a tremendously difficult one
for the French Canadian population in Ottawa.
The essential opposition to conscription for overseas service consisted
in the belief that it had not been proven necessary, and the demands for such a
policy stemmed from British imperialism.
Le Droit was keenly aware of the possible negative effects of a
policy of conscription, realizing, specifically, the negative effects on
national unity that could result – in fact, it had been making this same point
since before the declaration of war in 1939.
Finally, it did not believe that the purpose of the plebiscite was to
release the government from its pledge, but that the real issue was
conscription for overseas service itself.
Certainly, by this time any trust
of the King government stemming from its various promises to not conscript had
entirely eroded. Furthermore, the
earlier consensus was clearly at an end, as evidenced by Le Droit
various responses to the accusations of the English press, and by the
accusations that it made in return.
The Ottawa Journal was of a
similar mind to that of The Ottawa Citizen, and Le Droit in
opposing the method of plebiscite as the way to address the question of the
government’s pledge to not conscript for overseas service. It stated that, “The Journal agrees…that the
Dominion Government should decide for itself what it wants to do about
conscription and not ask the country to tell it by referendum…”
Prophetically, the Journal
also noted as follows,
If Mr. King should submit conscription to a
referendum…with the result…that one province voted overwhelmingly against it
and the other provinces for it, what then?
Would the province voting against conscription be permitted to veto the
will of the other provinces? Probably
not; but in that case, might we not have a cry from the province voting against
conscription that it was being dragooned by the other provinces, that it was
being deprived of its civil and natural rights by a combination against it?
The Journal then continued
and questioned whether or not the government should take the risks of such a
result. It continued, with regards to
responsible government, and noted that, “It (a referendum) involves the
abdication by a government of its responsibilities and functions…to the whims,
the caprice, the indifference and the possible misinformation of the people…” The Journal also noted that if the
Prime Minister wanted to escape from what was an election pledge, he was free
to call another election, instead of a plebiscite. In essence, the Journal responded to
the possibility of a plebiscite from the same point of view as the Citizen,
and from almost the same point of view as Le Droit. The only aspect that was not the same was Le
Droit’s opinion that the entire exercise was a product of a nation
enthralled with the British Empire; a point that the Journal might also
make, but only while seeing such a perspective as a net positive.
On January 13, 1942 the Journal
noted growing calls for total war, including conscription for overseas service,
stating that, “The simple truth is that in this country today public opinion
for conscription is becoming a full-flood tide, and no Government in any
democracy can ignore such opinion.”
Regarding King’s original no
conscription pledge, the Journal noted that the world had changed in the
previous two years, and that, “…to talk about a statesman standing amid those
dangers and insisting that he must abide by a pledge that he gave in a
different world, is surely to talk nonsense.”
The Journal then expressed the hope that no plebiscite would be
called, as, given the dangers that the country faced at the time, “This is no
time for an election, and this is no time for a referendum.” By this time, the divide between the various
newspapers in Ottawa was essentially over the question of “necessity”; the Citizen
and Journal seeing the situation as grave and requiring immediate
action, while Le Droit, as we have seen, not accepting that the case for
a change in policy having been made.
On January 16, 1942 the Journal
addressed the issue of conscription and national unity directly, indicating
that should the government tell the people of Quebec that conscription was
necessary to win the war, they would accept the policy. The Journal then noted that instead
of this, members of the government had themselves suggested that the
introduction of conscription would impinge on national unity - in essence, the Journal
implied that any linking of conscription and national unity were of the
government’s making. The Journal
ended its editorial by noting that the government’s support of a minority
opinion in Quebec in the face of the majority outside of that province was what
was truly threatening unity. One may
note the utter impossibility of reconciling this position with that of Le
Droit.
On January, 23, 1942 the Journal
noted that even if the plebiscite was answered in the affirmative, releasing
the government from its pledge, there was still no guarantee that the
government would introduce conscription, which it much preferred. Where the Journal saw the threat that
conscription for overseas service would not be introduced following the
plebiscite, Le Droit had expressed the fear that it would. Again, there was no way bridge a divide such
as this.
On February 10, 1942 the Journal
commented on the defeat of Arthur Meighen.
It noted that the defeat of Meighen meant that Canadians were not as
upset with the government’s plebiscite plans as the Journal and other
commentators had thought, and that the government was now free to simply get on
with it.
The Journal’s editorial of
March 28, 1942 called for the ‘yes’ side to organize to engage in the
plebiscite due about a month later.
Having rejected the method of referendum, the Journal noted that
what would be far worse would be an actual ‘no’ vote, consequently it belatedly
called for those supporting the affirmative to organize as soon as possible.
On April 9, 1942 the Journal responded
to King’s plebiscite address of that week.
It summarized his argument for a ‘yes’ vote in the plebiscite as
follows,
Those arguments he put under three headings: (1) Canada
is in desperate peril; (2) successful defence of Canada means to attack the
enemy beyond her borders; (3) ‘unless we do all we can to help others, we shall
have no right to expect them to do all they can to help us.’
The Journal continued and
noted that, “We must vote ‘Yes’ because this is the only opportunity available
to us to save Canada’s self-respect; to get conscription.”
On April 24 and 25, 1942 the Journal
urged a ‘yes’ vote in the plebiscite. When the vote was returned, its
editorial of April 28, 1942 concluded that King now had a free had concerning
the conscription issue. As regards
Quebec, the Journal noted that, “Quebec has no alternative – certainly
no other wise course – than to accept loyally the majority verdict.” In the end, the Journal came to the
same place reached by the Citizen some week and months before, namely,
that of subtly questioning the loyalty of those who would oppose conscription
for overseas service.
The plebiscite did not mean
conscription, but only the possibility of it now that the government had been
released from its pledge. In the end,
the government agreed to conscript for overseas service when necessary, but it
did not think it necessary immediately following the plebiscite, to the great
disappointment of many pro-conscriptionists.
In the weeks after the vote, all three papers maneuvered so as to try to
bring their preferred policy to fruition.
The Ottawa Citizen noted on May
5, 1942 that the people of Canada had clearly voted for national selective
service, meaning conscription for overseas service. What stood in the way of its implementation
was, “…party government that cannot give the necessary leadership.” It therefore renewed its calls for a national
government, without reference to party, with ministers serving without
specified portfolios, but simply for the purpose of directing the war.
On May 12, 1942 the Citizen
noted that the government’s move to amend the NMRA to permit conscription for
overseas service, “…is a formality which may or may not lead to national
selective service in any theatre of war.”
On May 13, 1942 the Citizen again called for a national
government, noting that, “…negative influences within the Liberal party cannot
go on forever as the dominant factor over Canada’s war policy. The will of the people has been expressed clearly
in the plebiscite.” In this situation, those
“negative influences” could only mean those who were cautioning the slow
introduction of conscription for overseas service, namely, French Canadian
Liberals.
On May 15, 1942 the Citizen
commented on the fact that 97% of Quebec males called up for service in Canada
had requested postponement, as compared to 53% in Ontario, and 31% in
Saskatchewan. The Citizen stated,
as regards these figures that, “There are other interesting and puzzling
aspects of the figures, and it is a pity the subject has not been more
thoroughly pursued.” It is suggested
that these figures, in that they illustrate an almost universal antipathy for
conscription within Quebec, even for defence of Canada, speak for
themselves. That the Citizen did
not note this obvious antipathy itself speaks to the inability of the
respective newspapers, and perhaps the respective communities in Ottawa to
comprehend each other during this time.
On May 26, 1942 the Citizen
continued its assault on the Liberal government by noting that,
The response of one million people of Quebec origin in
the New England states to the selective draft is visible evidence of adult
American nationhood. It is also a
conclusive answer to the agitators in French Canada against the constituted
authority of the government at Ottawa.
The enemy in Canada has been allowed to grow in strength by party
government on Parliament Hill. Race hate
is being propagated in Canada. It is
serving as a Nazi weapon to immobilize the Canadian people as effectively as
poison gas. Negative government has no
answer for the destructive activities of the enemy within.
One may note how those opposed to
conscription for overseas service had progressed in the minds of the editors of
the Citizen from being disloyal, to as noted above, “the enemy”. As was noted above, to the extent that these
“enemies within” were Quebec Liberal Ministers, these are also the very people Le
Droit indicated French Canada was relying upon to protect their interests
after the plebiscite. Regarding the
comment about American national adulthood, it will be noted here that the Citizen,
like Le Droit implied that Canada would be an “adult” nation by
following their prescribed polities – meaning, for the Citizen,
conscription; for Le Droit, neutrality.
On June 10, 1942 King announced
that he did not think conscription was necessary at this point in the war. The Citizen responded on June 16, 1942
with an editorial entitled, The Negative Compulsion of Restriction. In this editorial, the Citizen
concluded that, “It is abundantly plain that the most effective use of Canadian
manpower will never be made so long as Canada is held back by party
government.” It further emphasized that “Outside of the negative orbit of
isolationist politics…” the youth of Canada had responded magnificently
to the call to arms.
On July 8, 1942 the Citizen
noted that, contrary to what had been claimed by King at the start of the
plebiscite, national unity had not been enhanced by the experience. It
specifically stated that, “Instead of national unity we have, as an aftermath
of the voting and of the debate which has just ended what the French-language
paper of this city described the other day as ‘pro-found disunion.’” It noted that the issues driving the need for
conscription for overseas service, and the associated need for national
government were the national crisis inherent in the war situation, and the need
to confirm majority rule in Canada. It
is worth noting that in the eyes of Le Droit, the need was not proven,
and it was minority rights, not majority rule, that were its greatest
concern. Finally, on July 9, 1942 the Citizen
posed the question as to what “necessary” meant in response to the Prime
Minister’s assertion that conscription would come when deemed necessary.
The Citizen therefore
ended the post-plebiscite period wedded to its very first wartime policy
position, which was that the political system operating in Canada was not
sufficient to meet the needs of the day.
In the hurly-burly of political commentary, it had also lapsed into
rather unfortunate condemnation and insults regarding those who did not agree
with its option regarding the policy of conscription for overseas service.
Le Droit emphasized,
immediately following the plebiscite, that the original promise to not
conscript for overseas service, which it claimed had been made to Quebec alone,
remained intact and that the plebiscite had changed nothing. It also noted that there remained the need to
prove that conscription was actually necessary, which had not actually
occurred. In short, it rejected the
results of the vote to the extent they may have been interpreted as meaning the
introduction of conscription for overseas service, as follows,
Le gouvernement a promis a la
province de Québec que, dans le participation a la guerre, il lui demanderait
tout, excepte la conscription pour outre-mer.
La province de Québec a accepte ce compromis et, la semaine dernière,
elle a déclare qu’elle continuait de le regarder comme valide. Le gouvernement fédérale saurait passer
outre. N’a-t-il pas prévu les
difficultés qui pourraient surgir lorsqu’il a affirme qu-on vote affirmatif au
plébiscite ne signifierait pas nécessairement le mise en vigueur de la conscription?
On May 12, 1942 Le Droit
expressed the opinion that as soon as the NMRA was amended, conscription would
be introduced for overseas service, forthwith.
On June 11, 1942 however, following King’s declaration that it was not
necessary to conscript for overseas service at that moment in time, Le Droit
expressed the opinion that this declaration was consistent with what the Prime
Minister had been saying since before the war, however, Le Droit
predicted that in spite of his intent to conscript only if necessary, “Il
(Mackenzie King) est maintenant a la merci du group de ses ministres
anglo-canadiens favorables a la conscription pour le service militaire
outré-mer. Voila qui est clair.”
On June 13, 1942 Le Droit
voiced the opinion that history was repeating itself; that the events of 1942
were repeating what had happened in 1917 when conscription was imposed during
the First World War. On June 18, 1942 Le
Droit noted that the Prime Minister of Australia had indicated that he
thought Australia was exposed to invasion, and that if this was so, then North
American was also vulnerable. Le
Droit indicated that this meant that conscription for home service was even
more to be recommended, and conscription for overseas service should be
rejected, as there was a possible threat to Canada itself. On June 22, 1942 Le Droit confirmed
that, of course, French Canadian soldiers would serve should Vancouver Island
be attacked – confirming their commitment to defend Canada. In essence, through these editorials, Le
Droit took the arguments of those in favour of conscription stemming from a
world crisis threatening to Canada, and turned them on their head.
On June 30, 1942 Le Droit
spoke of the disunion inherent in the conscription debate, as has been noted
above in reviewing the editorials of the Citizen above. It concluded its editorial with warning about
the long-term effects of this divisive debate,
Pour les uns, la patrie, c’est
l’Empire britannique; pour les autres, c’est le Canada. Voila la raison fondamentale de la division
profonde qui se manifeste, de ce temps-ci, a la Chambre des communes.
Dans cette situation, il est
impossible d’arriver a l’union nationale.
On pourra imposer le conscription pour service militaire outre-mer. Une fois la loi votée, le peuple devra se
soumettre. Mais, lorsque la guerre sera
terminée, il faudra en payer le prix, et ce sera aux dépens de l’union
nationale. La division, qui existe
aujourd’hui, s’élargira inévitablement.
Les hommes d’Etat d’alors auront une lourde tache sur les bras.
When one recalls that the Citizen’s
response to this editorial warning by Le Droit about disunion was to
emphasize the importance of majority rule, the extent of the divide between
these two papers over this issue becomes obvious.
The Ottawa Journal responded to
the plebiscite by stating that the government now had a mandate to impose
conscription for overseas service, stating that, “…all of us know in our hearts
that this overwhelming ‘Yes’ vote came from people who believed passionately
that conscription is necessary to total war, and that total war must
come.”
As regards the question of the
Quebec vote, the Journal stated as follows,
Perhaps too many of us are inclined to take that vote too
tragically; to over-estimate its meaning.
Certainly it is wrong to interpret it as evidence of disunity. A difference of opinion, even when expressed
at the polls, is not necessarily disunity; disunity comes only when a minority,
having been voted down by democratic processes, refuses to accept or tries to
veto the will of the majority. Quebec
has not yet done that. There is nothing
to show that Quebec will try to do it.
The Journal therefore
chose to see no true threat in the “no” vote in Quebec, and no threat to unity
– the exact opposite of the position of Le Droit.
The Journal continued its
commentary by quoting Sir Wilfred Laurier after the imposition of conscription
in the First World War when he said that “The law must be obeyed.” Finally, it noted that the real threat to
national unity came from a government thwarting the will of the majority, not
from a majority thwarting a minority.
This blanket application of majority rule in the face of overwhelming
minority opposition is precisely what French Canada had feared the most in the
conscription issue since before the war.
That the Journal did not understand this underscores yet again
the deep misunderstanding between the respective communities at this point in
the war.
The Journal began to have
concerns about whether or not conscription would actually come to fruition, and
these concerns were reflected in its editorial of May 12, 1942 when it stated
that, “Just where we’re all being taken to now, we do not know.”
Following King’s June 10, 1940
statement that conscription was not necessary, the Journal stated as
follows, “We think he is wrong. We think
he is vitally wrong. We think his
position should be resented by every red-blooded Canadian who is dominated by
true Canadian patriotism.” This could
easily be interpreted as saying that those who did not favour conscription were
unpatriotic – in essence, the Journal had reached the same depths as the
Citizen in terms of its negative commentary. More than that, one senses a deep sense of
frustration in this editorial, and others of the time. The editorial continued and made the point
that conscription was not sufficient to maintain our forces in Europe once they
were fully engaged in the previous war, and that postponing conscription until
they were engaged would not guarantee that reserves were ready on time, as
those conscripts would have to be trained.
Similar arguments would be repeated two years later.
Finally, on June 13, 1942 the Journal
ran an editorial aimed at Quebec assuring them that no one who supported
conscription was trying to bring harm to the province of Quebec, more simply
that, “Those among us elsewhere who think that conscription is necessary, wish
to accept it for ourselves – to accept it for the sake of all the people of
Canada…” While this attempt to extent an
“olive branch” of sorts was certainly admirable given the ferocity of the
debate at the time, and while it did speak of an attempt to understand the
French Canadian perspective to some extent, the irony of saying that the Journal
supported conscription on behalf of all
Canadians, when it largely meant conscripting French Canadians who opposed it,
seems to have escaped them.
Regardless, the congenial
sentiment in this editorial stands the test of time as one of the very few
attempts at good-will during these difficult times. This was repeated on June 16, 1942, when the Journal
noted that, “Quebec’s opposition to conscription is perhaps
understandable. What is harder to
understand is the intellectual contortions of those in English-speaking Canada
who, believing in conscription, yet think they must accept the party line
first…’ In the end, the Journal tempered
its condemnation of its fellow French Canadian citizens, and ended up at much
the same position as the Citizen; that of condemning the government for
its handling of the entire matter.
The plebiscite period extended
for about six months from initial rumblings about a possible referendum to
release the government from its pledge to not conscript for overseas service in
early January of 1942, to the amendment of the NMRA, and the new policy of
conscription “if necessary” in June.
During this period, the consensus driven by events that was apparent in
the dark days of June 1940 dissolved, to be replaced by disunion and
misunderstanding.
The debate over conscription
became visceral around the time of the plebiscite, and after, with the Citizen
variously referring to opponents, directly and indirectly, as disloyal and
unintelligent, and finally enemies of Canada, and of essentially giving aid to
Nazis. Le Droit, for its part,
identified those in favour of conscription as Anglo-Canadians, colonialists,
and supporters of an “immature” Canada; directly identifying the issue with
nationality and race. Finally, The
Ottawa Journal, of the three newspapers, extended something like an
“olive branch” to the losers of the plebiscite, and certainly seemed more in
tune with the actual concerns of French Canadians than was the Citizen. Regardless, it did also lapse into
questioning the loyalty of those opposed to conscription on occasion.
By way of explanation for the
vehemence of the debate, as noted by Le Droit, in this situation it was
impossible to arrive at a consensus over this issue. This had been the case since the start of the
war. What had changed by mid-1942,
driven by changed events and a new conscription policy, was the tone and level
of importance attached to the debate.
For all concerned, this had become a matter, if not of national
existence, then at least of extreme importance almost equating to the
same. Political management of this issue
therefore took on extreme importance during this period of time. That two of three newspapers, and presumably
their constituents, could conclude that national unity had suffered greatly as
a result of the debate did not bode well for the next and final movement in the
conscription story.
Conscription - the Impossibility of Consensus
It had been admitted by Le
Droit that consensus was impossible as regards the issue of conscription
for overseas service. What remain to be
discussed are the actual introduction of said policy, and the reactions of the
newspapers within Ottawa to this development.
If the plebiscite period dragged
on for months, when conscription actually came, it arrived, by comparison, like
a whirlwind. The initial rumblings of
problems with the voluntary system, as reported in the Globe and Mail in
September of 1944 were not picked up on Ottawa papers. As a result, virtually nothing was mentioned
of the issue of conscription throughout the year leading right up to the firing
of Ralson on November 1, 1944, after which time there came a deluge of
commentary.
The Ottawa Citizen thought the
war won in the summer of 1944. It did
raise the issue of conscription in an editorial on July 12, 1944 where it
reviewed the history of the issue throughout the war, and concluded that it had
been harmful to national unity. While
the Citizen continued to call for the policy, the editorial reads less
like a call to arms, so much as a retrospective, even the title of the
editorial being in the past tense. With
the war considered won, the Citizen warned that the returning men would
know best who to purge from the political area when they returned, the
implication being that the Liberals would pay for their mismanagement of the
issue.
On July 27, 1944 the Citizen
again returned to the issue of conscription, and actually criticized the
Conservatives for launching new calls for “national service” stating as
follows,
In its eleventh hour conversion to the idea that in this
fifth year of war universal conscription should be imposed in Canada, the
Progressive Conservative party has embraced a course of action that is full of
dangers. The advocacy of such a policy
is just about four years too late, and every minute that policy has been put
off since at least the election of 1940 has made its ultimate application
progressively more perilous…The price of enforcing it in terms of…national
unity, might be so great at this stage of events as to be disastrous.
Clearly, the Citizen
considered that with the war essentially won, it was just too late to seek to
impose conscription for overseas service.
This position was confirmed at a much later date, when, on October 30,
1944 in response to rumblings of discontent within the federal Cabinet
regarding the issue, the Citizen stated that,
The Citizen stood for universal selective service when
the war broke out in 1939. But it has
pointed out before now that every hour and every day that has passed since then
has increased the danger of domestic strife if overseas conscription were
introduced….the chances of a change in policy precipitating a crisis in Canada
that might violently shatter the semblance of unity we now have are greater
than ever.
And so, just prior to the storm that brought
conscription for overseas service, its strongest proponent in Ottawa publicly
expressed their second thoughts. Those
thoughts were merely a passing phase.
On November 3, 1944 with Ralston
having been replaced by MacNaughton the Citizen voiced its full support
form “Whatever additional measures are deemed necessary, the first duty of the
government is to the troops, the fighting men whose lives are dedicated to
Canada’s fight for life.” While ignoring
the obvious, which was that Canada was not fighting for its life in late 1944,
it is hard to fathom such a stunning turn-around in terms of opinion regarding
the issue of conscription for overseas service was exhibited by the Citizen
between October 30 and mid-November, 1944, as further outlined below. The change may smack of pure opportunism,
although another explanation may rest in the conclusion on the part of the Citizen
that the war would last another year, as confirmed in its editorial for
November 7, 1944. Regardless, sixty
years later it makes for difficult, almost incomprehensible, reading.
On November 8, 1944 the Citizen
criticized the efforts of MacNaughton to convince NMRA soldiers to convert for
overseas service. On November 10th
it emphasized that the policy of voluntary enlistment had done more damage to
national unity that conscription would have right from the start of the
war. Finally, on November 14, 1944 the Citizen
returned fully to form, and stated that, “The whole trained manpower must be
employed to back the attack in the decisive battles of the war within the next
six months.”
When the decision finally came,
the Citizen, which had seen the political system as the root cause of
the failure to send conscripts overseas, immediately saw the vindication of
that same system in the decision to finally send them. It stated as follows, “Democracy is operating
in Canada. The government’s decision to
take the responsibility of sending trained reinforcements overseas by the
national selective draft is political democracy in action. The editorial ended by noting that
people everywhere “…will surely welcome the government’s decision…”
Not surprisingly, Le Droit
did not see the matter the same way as the Citizen. When the first rumblings of a problem in the
federal Cabinet leaked out at the end of October, 1944, Le Droit first
asked a series of questions surrounding the dismissal of Col. Ralston, seeing
the clear possibility of a link to conscription in the matter. On November 3, 1944 Le Droit asked
whether the cabinet crisis was over, and noted that the triumph of Ralston in
bringing about conscription for overseas service would have been very
unfortunate for the country. On November
4, 1944 Le Droit noted that the English press had rekindled its campaign
for conscription for overseas service.
Throughout these days, Le Droit seemed confused and misdirected
as to what was happening. On November 6,
1944 it finally concluded that the crisis was actually over the issue of
conscription for overseas service.
On November 9, 1944 Le Droit
became fully engaged, and in an editorial essentially written directly to the
Prime Minister underscored the French Canadian position as follows,
Il a ajoute que la mise en vigueur
de la loi de conscription comportait de très graves difficultés. Il comprend sans doute que les promesses
qu’il a faites ne sont pas de celles qui se renient facilement, et que c’est
une très lourde responsabilité a prétendre que d’imposer l’impôt du sang a une
population ou règnent de profondes divergences d’opinion sur l’étendue de la
participation du Canada a la guerre.
This was followed by editorials
on November 10, and 14, 1944 comparing the voluntary system to conscription,
noting Quebec’s contributions to the war effort to date, and decrying the
coercive aspects of conscription.
On November 21, 1944 Le Droit
ran an editorial which outlined the divisiveness engendered in the conscription
issues entitled Huit provinces canadiennes contre la province de Quebec. In this editorial it covered the arguments of
pro-conscriptionists including that without conscription Canada would be
dishonoured, and the United Nations would lose the war. It also noted that questions had been asked
about the commitment of French Canada to the war effort, and that questionable
allegations about French Canadian patriotism had been made. Finally, it noted that the minority in French
Canada was accused of holding up the will of the majority.
In response, the editorial noted
the part that Quebec had played in the war, and emphasized the illegitimacy of
majorities trampling on minority rights.
It further emphasized that after the imposition of conscription in 1917,
the Conservative Party did not recover in Quebec. It suggested that the same fate may befall
those who imposed conscription this time as well.
When conscription for overseas
service finally came, Le Droit expressed virtual astonishment that
Mackenzie King had agreed to send conscripts overseas. In terms of the rationale for his decision, Le
Droit noted that King altered his position to preserve power, as follows,
“Pour conserver le pouvoir, M. King renverse completement l’attitude qu’il
avait maintenant jusqu’a present dans cette crise.”
It also questioned his honesty in
respect of his public pronouncements – essentially calling him a liar - and
indicated that the people of Quebec would prepare for his defeat in the next
election, by noting that, “Une chose est indispensable dans la vie publique,
c’est la fidélité à la parole donnée…La conduite du première ministre a porte
un coupe terrible a la confiance du peuple dans la parole de ses chefs. Elle
prépare sa défaite aux prochaines élections générales.”
In short, Le Droit treated
the change in policy as a personal affront which reflects their earlier
comments about the personal nature of the promise to not send conscripts
overseas to fight. Underlying much of
its commentary during this time was the overarching question of minority
rights, with Le Droit asking if Quebec truly represented the French fact
in Canada as part of a Confederation arrangement between two nations, or was
Quebec now to be treated simply as one province in nine. This is a question that underscores many of
our own debates even today.
The Ottawa Journal, unlike the Citizen,
avoided assuming the war was won in the summer of 1944, and reminded readers of
the same with such editorials as Foolish End-Of-War Talk on October 9,
1944 and Victory Not Before Summer on November 1, 1944.
On November 4, 1944, the Journal
lauded Col. Ralston, acknowledging that the crisis was over manpower. On November 6, 1944, the Journal
commented on the Cabinet crisis
demanding to know what Ralston had recommended that resulted in his
leaving cabinet, and what was MacNaughton recommending in the alternative. They further noted, as regard the
reinforcement issue, “It is as grave an issue as this country has ever faced;
involving not merely the national honor, but involving whether or not we are
going to betray and desert our Allies and our sons overseas.” Finally, the Journal also emphasized
that this was not a “party matter” but one of national importance.
On November 10, 1944 the Journal
commented on King’s speech justifying not sending conscripts overseas in which
he noted, amongst other things that the volunteer army would not accept
conscripts in their ranks. In exploring
what the Journal saw as the true reason for not sending these reinforcements,
it stated that, “The truth that Mr. King’s real reason for practically firing
Col. Ralston and for withholding from our fighting men desperately needed
reinforcements is in fear of Quebec. The
Government takes its course, takes direction, from a minority.”
This Quebec-focused approach to
the issue continued on November 13, 1944, when the Journal ran an
editorial called National Loyalty in which it noted that ex-Premier
Godbout had stated that Quebec felt secure with King, and interpreted this
remark as meaning that they felt secure as they knew the Prime Minister would
protect Quebec against the wishes of the majority of the Canadian people. The editorial concluded by noting that,
British rule first, and Canadian union and independence
later, have been just to Quebec. British
rule is gone. Canada is mistress in her
own house, and may reasonably ask for loyalty from all her people to whatever a
majority declare constitutionally should be the national policy, without
discrimination.
The Journal therefore
launched directly into the question of loyalty, seeing subservience of the
minority to the majority will as the test of true loyalty, whereas Le Droit
saw the same demand for subservience as evidence of deep inequality and
injustice to minorities under majority rule.
As between these two papers, this debate constituted the essence of
their differences, which were not resolvable.
Once the government announced its
intention to send conscripts over seas, the Journal responded with
“…gratification that our armies in Europe are to receive reinforcements.” The editorial went on to note that the
decision was a victory for public opinion, and its concern to support soldiers
in Europe, and to avoid national dishonour.
Finally, as regards Quebec, the Journal noted that it had never
believed that with the right appeal, conscription would not have been accepted
by Quebec, and that the Journal hoped and expected French Canada to
accept the decision, and by so doing, help to preserve national unity.
Finally, the Journal
editorial of the next day noted that the Canadian people will have been
thoroughly disabused by the machinations of King during the mid-two weeks of
November, 1944 with, it is suggested, obvious implications for the coming
elections.
The events of October and
November, 1944, resulting in the introduction of conscription for overseas
service, transpired so quickly that much of the negative commentary witnessed
during the prolonged Plebiscite campaign and after simply did not emerge. Part of the reason for this must rest with
the fact that the paper which was most negatively vocal during the plebiscite
period – The Ottawa Citizen – actually saw its preferred policy put into
action. The fact that the war was also
clearly almost over, and that only conscripts already in uniform would likely
see battle may also have acted to temper commentary as the human price of this
decision was going to be far less than what it would have been had the decision
been taken in 1942. In fact, only 69
conscripts died in battle.
Of the newspapers, the Journal
and Le Droit were most engaged during this period. They represented the two classic approaches
to his period
Regardless of the divergent
opinions regarding conscription, all three newspapers prophesied that the
Liberals would pay a political price for their wartime management of the
conscription issue – the Citizen thinking that returning men would
punish them for not introducing it; while Le Droit thinking that the
Quebecois would punish the Liberals for doing precisely that. In the end, the Liberals proved all
prognosticators wrong. The won the
election of June 11, 1945, and ruled for eleven more years.
Conclusion
This paper has used editorial
content from three Ottawa newspapers to explore and discuss the issue of
conscription as debated within those same pages during the Second World
War. It must be noted that this is a limited
view of the issue as reflected in the life of the community as newspapers can
only ever reflect one small portion of the totality of the political life of
any community.
Newspapers are limited in that
they are business operations that must sell in order to survive. This distorts reporting in the direction of
the scandalous and profane, and away from the mundane. In essence, the need to sell may drive
content that is more exaggerated than is apparent in the surrounding community.
Newspapers also try to reflect
not only the opinions of their audiences, but they also try to change public
opinion to suit the biases of their editors, owners, and, occasionally,
advertisers and patrons as well. In that
sense, newspapers reflect, to some extent, the personal bias of those involved
with the paper itself – this is unavoidable.
A wider review of political
events in Ottawa concerning the issue of conscription during the Second World
War could include such things as records of sermons preached during the war;
records in government archives regarding the political conditions in Ottawa;
any polling done that was specific to the city; and, obviously, interviews with
any residents who were living in Ottawa during the war who may still be
alive.
While useful, newspapers are
therefore only one small part of the overall picture of the political issue of
conscription in Ottawa during the war.
This paper limited itself to only these three sources, as to include a
review of all possible sources would be beyond the parameters of the paper
itself, including such things as the number of pages permitted and sources
used.
In looking at how the issue of
conscription was reflected in the editorials of The Ottawa Citizen,
The Ottawa Journal, and Le Droit during the Second World War,
three distinct periods emerged: a period of consensus regarding the issue from
March of 1939 until just before the attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1939;
a second period wherein this consensus broke down, which occurred during the
period of the National Plebiscite from December of 1941, to after the
plebiscite in April of 1942; and third period in which the impossibility of
achieving any future consensus became obvious as conscription for overseas
service became a reality, which occurred in October and November of 1944.
Regarding the first period of
consensus, there was a divergent opinion regarding conscription as the spectre
of war arose in the summer of 1939, through to the crisis of May and June 1940,
with consensus being reflected in the fact that no paper was willing to raise
the question to the level of division at this early stage.
The Ottawa Citizen preferred
immediate conscription for overseas service out of a concern for equality of
sacrifice between social classes, and out of a concern that conscription for
service only in Canada, combined with volunteer armies for overseas service
would prove unworkable. The Ottawa
Journal was less reluctant to support all-out conscription, partially as it
saw that the war would depend heavily on air-power, which would require a
different type of military organization from a conscript army. Both of these communities supported
mobilization of the economy and society for something like “total war”; for the
Citizen as a recognition of the totalitarian nature of the war, and for
the Journal out of a perceived need to assist the British Empire.
Le Droit did not
initially support conscription of any sort, but considered, like the Citizen,
that, regardless of political promises to not conscript, it was inevitable as a
reflection of English Canada’s desire to support what French Canada saw as a
British imperial war. The Citizen
thought conscription inevitable as they though the totalitarian nature of the
war would drive policy in that direction, and that the idea of both a volunteer
and conscript army, in the event of conscription for service in Canada only,
would prove unworkable. To avoid
conscription, Le Droit preferred neutrality, and that an expeditionary
force not be sent in the event of war.
All three newspapers, however,
treated the issue with “kid gloves” at the start of the war, prompting the
description of a conscription consensus.
As noted, the consensus was not over the policy choice of conscription
itself; rather it was over the need to push harder for one’s particular
view-point to the extent of dividing the community.
Like the government, the
newspapers in Ottawa during the war altered their opinions regarding
conscription as the war progressed.
The first change came as a result
of the crisis in France in May and June 1940, which brought about the National
Resources Mobilization Act. Out of
this crisis, and the government’s decision to conscript for service within
Canada, came a modified consensus regarding the policy of conscription between
the three papers.
As has been seen, Le Droit
approved of the new policy as it was consistent with the promise to not
conscript for overseas service, and as a reflection both of the gravity of the
news from France, and the fact that their preference for neutrality was unreal
in light of the Germans assault on neutral countries. Finally, and as important as these was the
fact that Le Droit had just re-elected the Liberals under King.
The Ottawa Journal, chastened
after the disastrous defeat of the Conservatives in the March 1940 election,
accepted the change as a release from political purgatory. At this point in time, with the Conservative
defeat so fresh, that paper was in no position to push beyond the government’s
announced policy, and to ask for conscription for overseas service as well.
The Ottawa Citizen saw the
introduction of conscription for service within Canada, coupled with a call for
a total war effort, as a vindication of their opinion since the start of the
war. They would continue to push for
full conscription, but as of June 1940, they could point to a measure of
success in the prosecution of their preferred war policy.
By the end of June 1940 then, the
government’s policy of limited conscription was accepted by all three
newspapers in Ottawa. This “consensus
driven by events” would not last.
The call for conscription for
overseas service picked up toward the end of 1941, and increased massively in
strength following the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Allied military disasters
of early 1942. While both the Citizen
and the Journal did generally support conscription throughout the war,
and Le Droit opposed it, the previous consensus had largely dissolved by
early 1942. In essence, by this time the
debate had become much more serious and divisive.
In particular, during the
plebiscite campaign the editorialists in Ottawa became quite vicious, trading
barbs and veiled insults with their opposite number. While during the phase of consensus there was
a measure of decorum and respect, perhaps reflecting a desire not to raise the
issue to a point of division, and where as by the crisis of May and June 1940
actually threw the papers into something like a consensus driven by events, by
the spring of 1942 this was certainly at an end. By then, the debate had become quite
vehement, and the papers much more strident in their attitudes to one
another. This would continue to the end
of the debate, which ended upon the introduction of conscription for overseas
service in late 1944. The argument at
the point had come to reflect the same concerns as are apparent in our own
time; minority versus majority rights, and the question of Quebec’s place in
Canada as one of two founding nations, or simply one province amongst many.
Conscription was a watershed
issue in the life of the country, and of the city of Ottawa. During the Second World War, Ottawa witnessed
three different newspapers: The Ottawa Citizen; The Ottawa Journal;
and Le Droit, engaged in a running debate over the merits of the policy
of conscription for overseas service.
These debates accurately mirrored the debate occurring within the
country as a whole.
While there was much disagreement
between these three newspapers as regards the policy of conscription for
overseas service during the war, where there was obvious agreement was with
respect to the question of national unity, and the effects of this debate. By the plebiscite of 1942, it was obvious to
all three papers that this issue had serious implications for national
unity. Furthermore, there was also
consensus, certainly in the English press, that it was the policies of the King
government that had been at least partially responsible for this. Whether there was a better alternative to the
path followed by the government of the time, give the divisiveness of the issue
itself, it is probably impossible to tell.
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